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BENCHMARK MANIPULATION 
ANDREW VERSTEIN* 
Abstract: Substantial scholarship has questioned whether market manipulation 
is impossible and regulation unnecessary. This Article challenges orthodox un-
derstandings of manipulation, showing that they reflect an obsolete view of mar-
kets. While manipulation skeptics discuss prices, markets focus on benchmarks 
of price—and so do the manipulators who prey upon them. Benchmarks such as 
LIBOR or the S&P 500 summarize market prices and they have become essential 
to contemporary markets. They are written directly into industrial contracts, fi-
nancial derivatives, statutes, and regulations, and so their accuracy affects the 
economy every bit as much as the prices themselves. They are also are much eas-
ier to manipulate than underlying prices, because such benchmarks are typically 
derived from only a small slice of the market. For example benchmarks of ex-
change rates—the price of Euros and Yen—reflect only trade prices in a single 
venue, during a two-minute period of trading. If a manipulator can strategically 
position trades—placing aggressive purchases on that venue and aggressive sales 
elsewhere—they can bias the benchmark and therefore project influence over the 
market as a whole. As manipulation becomes increasingly synonymous with 
benchmark manipulation, it becomes clear why the recent push by regulators and 
courts to require fraud in manipulation cases is fundamentally misguided and 
how a better approach might be fashioned. Likewise, recent proposals to exten-
sively regulate the creation of benchmarks are shown to misunderstand the me-
chanics of benchmark manipulation. 
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Do not falsify measurements, whether in length, weight or volume. You 
must have an honest balance, honest weights, an honest dry measure, and 
an honest liquid measure.  
–Leviticus 19:35-36 
INTRODUCTION 
This is a period of unremitting market manipulation. Allegations have 
rocked the markets in interest rates,1 foreign currency,2 gold,3 palladium,4 
milk,5 oil,6 biofuels,7 natural gas,8 and aluminum,9 to say nothing of the inexo-
rably rising tide of stock price manipulation.10 By all accounts, manipulation is 
in its season.11 
This should be impossible. The scholarly consensus as to the economics 
of manipulation is skeptical, to say the least.12 To drive up the global price of 
                                                                                                                           
 1 LIBOR: The World’s Most Important Number, MONEYWEEK (Oct. 10, 2008), http://www.
moneyweek.com/personal-finance/libor-the-worlds-most-important-number-13816, archived at http://
perma.cc/QM8K-CPQN; see Halah Touryalai, This Is Why Wall Street Hates Admitting Wrongdoing, 
FORBES (Oct. 31, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/halahtouryalai/2013/10/31/this-is-why-wall-
street-hates-admitting-wrongdoing/, archived at http://perma.cc/5XKW-JS4P. 
 2 See In re Citibank, N.A., CFTC No. 15-03 (Nov., 11, 2014), available at http://www.cftc.gov/
ucm/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/legalpleading/enfcitibankorder111114.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/V7NG-6E22. 
 3 Madison Marriage, Gold Price Rigging Fears Put Investors on Alert, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2014, 
at 1 (retracted article describing widespread manipulation in gold market). 
 4 Christopher Louis Pia, CFTC No. 11-17, 2011 WL 3228315, at *1 (Commodity Futures Trading 
Comm’n July 25, 2011). 
 5 Allison Fitzgerald, Why Dairy Farmers Are in a Sour Mood, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK MAG-
AZINE (May 27, 2010), http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/10_23/b4181026633805.htm, 
archived at http://perma.cc/C4XL-TBDX. 
 6 Justin Scheck & Jenny Gross, Traders Try to Game Platts Oil-Price Benchmark, WALL ST. J., 
June 19, 2013, at A1, available at http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887324682204
578517064053636892, archived at https://perma.cc/5XFU-JNNN?type=pdf. 
 7 Ajay Makan et al., European Commission Raids Oil Groups Over Price Benchmarks, FIN. 
TIMES, May 14, 2013, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/f1574eb6-bca2-11e2-b344-00144feab7de.html, 
archived at https://perma.cc/S565-896V?type=pdf. 
 8 Javier Blas, Regulators Probe UK Natural Gas Market, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2012, at 17, avail-
able at http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/611cc5c2-2d02-11e2-9211-00144feabdc0.html?siteedition=
intl#axzz2uWm2Ydzi, archived at https://perma.cc/Q3SM-ZN5P?type=pdf. 
 9 David Kocieniewski, A Shuffle of Aluminum, but to Banks, Pure Gold, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 
2013, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/21/business/a-shuffle-of-aluminum-but-to-
banks-pure-gold.html?_r=0, archived at https://perma.cc/8Q2S-A72Y?type=pdf.  
 10 See generally, e.g., MICHAEL LEWIS, FLASH BOYS (2014) (describing allegedly manipulative 
conduct by high frequency traders). 
 11 Cf. Deuteronomy 11:14 (“[T]hen I will send rain on your land in its season . . . .”). 
 12 Daniel Fischel & David Ross, Should the Law Prohibit “Manipulation” in Financial Markets?, 
105 HARV. L. REV. 503, 553 (1991). See generally Tālis J. Putniņš, Market Manipulation: A Survey, 
26 J. ECON. SURVS. 952 (2012) (discussing literature on market manipulation, including contemporary 
empirical models). 
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an asset—such as silver—you have to buy a truly enormous amount. But you 
haven’t gotten rich unless you can sell at the inflated price, and whatever forc-
es raised the price while you bought will reverse when you try to sell. In theo-
ry, the plummeting price should precisely evaporate your profits. And in the 
meantime, you had to pay to transport and store a quarter of the world’s sil-
ver.13 If theory predicts that it is hard to manipulate prices, then why is manip-
ulation so widespread? 
This Article argues that manipulation scholarship and law both reflect an 
outdated view of markets. Both are fixated on prices. But markets care rela-
tively little about prices. Instead, they care about price benchmarks, and so do 
the manipulators who prey upon them. 
Price benchmarks are institutions that represent prices.14 For example, the 
Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) approximates the stock market, the Con-
sumer Price Index (CPI) summarizes the cost of living. Markets are far too 
vast and complex, and the notion of “price” far too elusive, for anyone to actu-
ally do much with prices. Toyotas are sold and resold all around the country, 
with different features and quality levels. No rational person would try to dis-
cover and analyze all this data. But no one wants to overpay either. So you 
might rationally consult the Kelley Blue Book for its assessment of the 2013 
Camry you have been eyeing. Price benchmarks, such as the Kelley Blue 
Book, compile market data and distill it into a single comprehensible number. 
Benchmarks serve us well, but their rise is a mixed blessing. Our increasing 
reliance on benchmarks has made them an attractive target for manipulation. We 
trust these benchmarks enough to write them into contracts, administrative regu-
lations, and statutes. Once the benchmark is hardwired into legal relationships, 
manipulating the proxy pays off just as much as manipulating the underlying 
reality.15 If the manipulator has agreed to sell oil at the benchmark price, tamper-
ing with the benchmark has the same effect as moving the worldwide supply of 
oil.16 
                                                                                                                           
 13 Storage costs are more obvious for physical assets than for securities, but the holding costs 
remain in any case. See infra note 45 and accompanying text.  
 14 See In re LIBOR-Based Fin. Instruments Antitrust Litig., 962 F. Supp. 2d. 606, 612 n.5 
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“LIBOR, of course, does not correspond to any actual interest rate charged for the 
use of U.S. dollars, but rather is an index based on the LIBOR panel banks’ estimates of the rate at 
which they would be able to borrow funds.”), appeal dismissed, No. 13-3565-L, 2013 WL 9557843 
(2d Cir. Oct 30, 2013), cert. granted sub nom. Gelboim v. Bank of Am. Corp., 134 S. Ct. 2876 (2014).  
 15 See, e.g., id. at 612–13 (discussing the relationship between Eurodollar futures contracts, LI-
BOR, and the market LIBOR is intended to represent—interest rates for three-month U.S. dollar de-
posits in foreign banks). Because Eurodollar futures cite LIBOR in their contracts, these future con-
tracts can be manipulated either by influencing LIBOR or by influencing the underlying market for 
USD. See id. 
 16 See infra notes 144–175 and accompanying text. 
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At the same time, it is considerably easier to bias a benchmark. By their 
nature, benchmarks describe a market based on some small slice of it. Careful 
manipulators can bias that slice. It is daunting to corner the world currency 
market, but it is less daunting to corner the two percent of the market whose 
price is considered by the leading benchmark.17 By shrinking the domain over 
which the manipulator must exercise influence, benchmarks directly circum-
vent the principal challenges to manipulation identified by scholars. 
This Article contends that market manipulation is increasingly synony-
mous with benchmark manipulation. This account is at odds with the assump-
tions now regnant in manipulation scholarship.18 One recent article by leaders 
in the field flatly asserts that benchmark manipulation is not manipulation be-
cause its effects are not market-wide.19 On the contrary, because it is not mar-
ket-wide, benchmark abuse is a viable form of manipulation. Other scholars 
allow for the possibility of benchmark manipulation, but no previous work has 
identified benchmark manipulation as a dominant form of contemporary mar-
ket abuse, explained how it overcomes theoretical challenges to manipulation, 
or provided sufficiently granular analysis to guide pragmatic responses. 
Owing to their attention to traditional price manipulation, scholars have 
missed the chance to give advice to policymakers at a time when government 
officials are actively seeking solutions. In the United States, courts are facing a 
flood of manipulation-related litigation.20 In Europe, a debate rages about how 
to regulate the benchmark sector to make it less vulnerable to manipulation to 
begin with.21 This Article seeks to redirect academic discussion in light of the 
character of contemporary manipulation to help inform law and policy in 
America and Europe. 
The structure of the Article is as follows. Part I describes the academic 
treatment of manipulation, and the skepticism it has engendered. Part II ex-
plains how benchmarks operate and how they make ideal vectors for manipula-
tion. Part III demonstrates those mechanics, using manipulation in three mar-
kets as case studies: foreign currency, crude oil, and equity securities. This 
Article will show that nearly all manipulation in each of these assets is, in fact, 
benchmark manipulation. Part IV then draws lessons from this analysis to help 
critique and improve law in America and elsewhere. 
                                                                                                                           
 17 See infra notes 97–143 and accompanying text. 
 18 See infra notes 22–54 and accompanying text. But see Steve Thel, $850,000 in Six Minutes—
The Mechanics of Securities Manipulation, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 219, 248 (1994) (emphasizing how 
widespread reliance on price reports could support manipulative actions). 
 19 Albert S. Kyle & S. Viswanathan, How to Define Illegal Price Manipulation, 98 AM. ECON. 
REV. 274, 274 (2008). 
 20 See infra notes 97–202 and accompanying text. 
 21 See infra notes 270–298 and accompanying text. 
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This last Part considers two classes of solutions. First, if the threat of liti-
gation is to constrain manipulators, we must reverse many decades of conflat-
ing manipulation with fraud. Many manipulations do not involve fraud, as 
such, and this is true of benchmark manipulation. Instead, we must recognize 
benchmark manipulation as a distinctive form of market abuse. Fortunately, 
statutory language already exists to support this approach. Second, proactive 
solutions must be found to improve the integrity of benchmarks before manip-
ulation occurs. This subpart engages proposals offered by regulators, providing 
topical advice to policy makers who are very actively considering solutions. 
As such, it provides advice at a time when policymakers are genuinely availa-
ble to academic engagement relating to a vitally important topic.  
I. THE ECONOMICS OF PRICE MANIPULATION 
Elementary economics teaches that price is set by the interaction of sup-
ply and demand. As such, it might seem obvious that a manipulator can profit-
ably manipulate an asset by buying up a great deal of the asset. Once the price 
rises, the manipulator can sell her holdings at the inflated price, escaping and 
leaving others are to deal with the eventual return to reality. Fear of this kind 
of scheme influenced drafters of our principal market abuse laws, who be-
lieved that such manipulation played an important role in creating asset bub-
bles and subsequent crashes.22 
This intuitive view—that traders can harmfully, but profitably, move 
prices—has been subject to withering criticism. Some scholars have disputed it 
empirically.23 The most trenchant critiques, however, are theoretical, seeking 
to overthrow the notion that manipulative trading is ever likely to occur.24 Spe-
                                                                                                                           
 22 See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 86-70, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended in 15 U.S.C. § 77b (2012)); Pub. 
L. 93-479, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended in 15 U.S.C. § 78b (2012)); Grain Futures Act of 1922, 
Pub. L. No. 67-33I, § 369(3), 42 Stat. 998, 999 (1922), amended by Futures Trading Act of 1982, Pub. 
L. No. 97-444, § 203(3), 96 Stat. 2294, 2298 (1983); S. Rep. No. 93-1131, at 2 (1974), reprinted in 
1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5843, 5844 (manipulation may “demoralize the market to the injury of producers 
and consumers and the exchanges themselves”); 7 LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REG-
ULATION 3200 n.213 (3d ed. 2003). 
 23 See, e.g., Guolin Jiang et al., Market Manipulation: A Comprehensive Study of Stock Pools, 77 
J. FIN. ECON. 147, 168–69 (2005) (showing that prominent 1920s “manipulators” had likely done no 
such thing, supporting the suggestion that politics must have driven the regulatory agenda); Paul Ma-
honey, The Stock Pools and the Securities Exchange Act, 51 J. FIN. ECON. 343, 344–45 (1999); see 
also Putniņš, supra note 12, at 952–67 (“Empirical research has been limited by the lack of data on 
manipulation.”); cf. Thel, supra note 18, at 287 (“We do not know how often prices are manipulated, 
how much harm manipulation does or how existing manipulation rules influence behavior.”). 
 24 See, e.g., Joseph A. Cherian & Robert A. Jarrow, Market Manipulation, in 9 HANDBOOK IN 
OPERATIONS RESEARCH AND MANAGEMENT SCIENCE: FINANCE 629 (1995); Joseph Cherian & 
Vikram Kuriyan, Informationless Manipulation in a Market Maker-Type Economy, 1–4 (Bos. Univ. 
Sch. of Management, Working Paper No. 93-49 1993) (concluding that manipulation is not possible 
under standard economic assumptions). Another theoretical response argues that not all putative ma-
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cifically, it has been argued that trade-based manipulation is “self-deterring.”25 
That is, the economic challenges to manipulative trading are so daunting that it 
need not even be illegal.26 No statute is needed to prevent traders from wasting 
their money on “sure-to-lose strategies.”27 
The manipulative trader faces two principal challenges. First, manipula-
tive trading is predicated on the notion that trades can move market prices, but 
those movements are likely to occur in just such a way as to negate all profits: 
When a trader tries to buy a stock, he drives up the price. When he 
tries to sell it, he drives down the price. Thus, any attempt to manip-
ulate the price of a stock by buying and selling requires the trader to 
“buy high” and “sell low.” This is the reverse of what is required to 
make a profit.28 
Unless the manipulator can escape this fearful symmetry, her scheme will not 
allow her to profit from her artificial price.29 
Second, manipulative trading entails substantial costs and risks for the 
manipulator. Many large purchases of assets fail to have any price impact at 
all.30 To raise the price of an asset by two or three percent might require pur-
chasing two or three percent of the outstanding supply of a very large market.31 
The market capitalization of Apple, to take one bloated example, is over $683 
billion,32 with over six billion dollars in daily trading volume.33 Daily trading 
                                                                                                                           
nipulations are actually socially harmful when their price accuracy and liquidity effects are both taken 
into account. Kyle & Viswanathan, supra note 19, at 274–75. 
 25 Fischel & Ross, supra note 12, at 512; cf. Thel, supra note 18, at 261 (“Manipulations that 
depend on profitable offsetting trades [i.e. trade based manipulation] are much more likely to be self-
deterring than contract-based manipulations—at least in the sense that the manipulator cannot be as 
confident of success.”). 
 26 Fischel & Ross, supra note 12, at 512. 
 27 See id. at 518. 
 28 Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, Stock-Price Manipulation, 5 REV. FIN. STUD. 503, 506 (1992); 
accord Fischel & Ross, supra note 12, at 512 (discussing the need to sell at the artificial price). 
 29 See Putniņš, supra note 12, at 962 (discussing theoretical conditions that may allow for manip-
ulation); Thel, supra note 18, at 268. 
 30 Robert E. Holthausen et al., The Effect of Large Block Transactions on Security Prices: A 
Cross-Sectional Analysis, 19 J. FIN. ECON., 237, 245–46 (1987). Even large funds are often able to 
trade without influencing market price due to the alacrity of liquidity providers. Cf. Bruno Navarro, 
Vanguard CIO: High Frequency Trading Cuts Costs, CNBC (Oct. 18, 2012), http://www.cnbc.com/id/
049434073, archived at http://perma.cc/L2HU-JXJ9. 
 31 Holthausen et al., supra note 30 at 237–38. Some former currency traders have estimated that 
at least 200 million euros would be needed to move an exchange rate. Liam Vaughan et al., Traders 
Said to Rig Currency Rates to Profit Off Clients, BLOOMBERG (June 11, 2013), http://www.
bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-11/traders-said-to-rig-currency-rates-to-profit-off-clients.html, ar-
chived at https://perma.cc/34CQ-YQ3Y?type=image. 
 32 Historical Prices, Apple Inc. (AAPL)-November 21, 2014, YAHOO FIN., http://finance.yahoo.
com/q/hp?s=AAPL&a=00&b=18&c=2013&d=00&e=18&f=2013&g=d, archived at http://perma.cc/
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in gold likewise daunting, exceeding two hundred forty billion dollars per 
day.34 In such large markets, even major players appear to have tiny stakes.35 
To impact the market price for an asset might require an outlay of billions of 
dollars.36 
This large outlay comes with large costs. First, there are transaction costs. 
Many assets are traded with a bid-ask spread. For example, a market maker in 
Catamaran Corporation stock might offer to buy for $51.24 per share or sell at 
$54.00 per share.37 The difference between the bid price and ask price, $2.76, 
is the market maker’s profit from making one sale and one purchase. It is also 
the cost to a trader who buys and then promptly resells, sometimes called a 
“round trip.” 
If someone wished to profit from a manipulation of Catamaran stock, they 
would need to be able to move the price by at least $2.76, or about five per-
cent, in order to just break even on the trading costs.38 Thus, any manipulative 
trade begins with a large negative expected value.39 It is thought that manipula-
tion is easiest for illiquid assets—those that are infrequently traded—because a 
large purchase or sale can make a splash in a small and placid market. In reali-
                                                                                                                           
HGY8-Z66R (last visited Dec. 29, 2014); Apple Reports Fourth Quarter Results: Strong iPhone, Mac, 
& App Store Sales Drive Record September Quarter Revenue & Earnings, APPLE PRESS INFO., 
http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2014/10/20Apple-Reports-Fourth-Quarter-Results.html, archived at 
http://perma.cc/YCY2-3TSZ (last visited Dec. 29, 2014). 
 33 YAHOO FIN., supra note 32. The boundaries between markets blur because of the possibility of 
substitutes. Even if one could buy all of the world’s Apple stock, many investors would not mind 
shifting to Microsoft. Fischel & Ross supra note 12, at 513–14; Myron S. Scholes, The Market for 
Securities: Substitution Versus Price Pressure and the Effects of Information on Share Prices, 45 J. 
BUS. 179, 181–82 (1972). 
 34 Jack Farchy, Sizing up the Gold Market, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2011, http://www.ft.com/
intl/cms/s/0/eb342ad4-daba-11e0-a58b-00144feabdc0.html, archived at https://perma.cc/GWZ7-
C5X6?type=pdf. 
 35 See Pratima Desai et al., Goldman’s New Money Machine: Warehouses, REUTERS (July 29, 
2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/29/us-lme-warehousing-idUSTRE76R3YZ20110729, 
archived at http://perma.cc/47UB-JF53. Goldman Sachs has lately been associated with manipulative 
efforts in the aluminum industry, owing to its ownership of some of the world’s largest and most im-
portant warehouses. But those warehouse store only about 1.1 million tons of the forty-five million con-
sumed in 2011, a mere 2.4% of the $100 billion market. See Primary Aluminum Consumption 2011–
2013, EUROPEAN ALUMINUM ASS’N, http://www.alueurope.eu/consumption-primary-aluminium-
consumption-in-world-regions/, archived at http://perma.cc/AV8B-MBT5 (last visited Dec. 31, 2014); 
Aluminum Prices and Aluminum Price Charts, INVESTMENTMINE, http://www.infomine.com/
investment/metal-prices/aluminum/, archived at http://perma.cc/VTR3-AFHM (last visited Dec. 29, 
2014).  
 36 Cf. Vaughan et al., supra note 31 (echoing the thoughts of finance professor, Andy Naranjo, 
that the large and competitive FOREX market would be hard to influence). 
 37 Summary: Catamaran Corporation (CRTX), YAHOO FIN., (Nov. 12, 2014, 4:14PM), http://
finance.yahoo.com/q?s=CTRX, archived at http://perma.cc/L5SC-T9AC. 
 38 The manipulation would need to be even higher if brokerage fees were also charged. 
 39 See Fischel & Ross supra note 12, at 518. 
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ty, however, these are precisely the assets for which bid-ask spreads are widest 
and the trading costs highest.40 
Second, there are carrying costs. Taking delivery of assets can be costly. 
The notorious Hunt brothers, two Texas tycoons, once owned about half of the 
world’s deliverable silver in what many regarded as a manipulative scheme.41 
In order to hoard silver, they could not just buy silver futures; they had to actu-
ally receive truckloads of silver and warehouse it. Transportation, storage, and 
insurance costs can be substantial for any physical asset. Imagine the challeng-
es to hoarding fresh eggs,42 uranium,43 or ice.44 
The cost to receive and hold securities in an age of electronic markets 
may be lower than that of physical assets, but the costs are still substantial. All 
investments, manipulative or otherwise, bring opportunity costs.45 The money 
spent acquiring a pool of Apple stock is money that cannot be deployed pro-
ductively elsewhere. 
Opportunity cost is not just investment gain forgone, it is risk imprudently 
accepted. It is tautological that a large buyer of a single asset forgoes diversifi-
cation. Portfolio Theory demonstrates that diversification is the only free lunch 
in the financial markets.46 Investors who buy a wide basket of goods avoid idi-
osyncratic risk with no reduction in expected returns. The Hunt brothers 
learned this cost of insufficient diversification, too: billionaires when they 
started building their silver empire, they lost the majority of their family 
wealth when the price of silver dropped by fifty percent on a single Thurs-
day.47 
An investor who buys a mammoth quantity of any asset exposes herself to 
the idiosyncratic risk that her investment may fail. After also accounting for 
                                                                                                                           
 40 Id. This is not a coincidence. Bid-ask spreads are a function of, inter alia, inventory costs and 
adverse selection risk. High spreads are to be predicted in markets where scarcity or low turnover 
makes information trading more likely. 
 41 See Minpeco, S.A. v. Hunt, 718 F. Supp. 168, 170–71 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Robert D. McFadden, 
Nelson Bunker Hunt, 88, Oil Tycoon with a Texas-Size Presence, Dies, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2014, at 
A24; Mathilde Arandia, The Fame and Folly of Cornering a Market: The Hunt Brothers and Silver, 
FORTUNE, http://money.cnn.com/galleries/2010/fortune/1008/gallery.corner_markets.fortune/4.html, 
archived at http://perma.cc/TT5A-B6YP (last updated Aug. 13, 2010). 
 42 Great W. Food Distrib., Inc. v. Brannan, 201 F.2d 476, 480–84 (7th Cir. 1953) (involving fresh 
egg manipulation). 
 43 In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contract Lit., 436 F. Supp. 990, 991–94 (J.P.M.L. 
1977) (involving conspiracy to manipulate price of uranium). 
 44 See, RICHARD O. CUMMINGS, THE AMERICAN ICE HARVESTS: A HISTORICAL STUDY IN 
TECHNOLOGY, 1800–1918, at 14–15 (1949) (explaining how melting ice was a major obstacle to com-
petitive prices). 
 45 We might reasonably characterize opportunity costs and risk to be a type of carrying cost. 
 46 HARRY M. MARKOWITZ, PORTFOLIO SELECTION: EFFICIENT DIVERSIFICATION OF INVEST-
MENTS 5 (2d ed. 1991). 
 47 Arandia, supra note 41. 
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trading costs, the manipulator faces large costs to attempt her scheme. And for 
what? Symmetrical price movement suggests that the manipulator should not 
even expect to sell for gain. Indeed, the challenges to manipulative trading 
seem daunting. 
Although skeptical arguments have been influential,48 these difficulties 
have not persuaded all scholars that manipulative trading is a dead end.49 Ra-
ther, theoretical models have been offered demonstrating the viability of ma-
nipulative trading,50 and empirical projects have recently sought to provide 
validation.51 Many of these scholars would argue that manipulative potential is 
greatest where the manipulator has entered into contracts dependent upon mar-
                                                                                                                           
 48 See, e.g., Merritt B. Fox et al., Short Selling and the News: A Preliminary Report on an Empir-
ical Study, 54 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 645, 653 (2010) (“[P]ure manipulations cannot be expected to 
yield much profit, if any, because the purchase orders needed to effect a cover will push prices up just 
as the sale orders prompted by the original short sale pushed them down.”); Kyle & Viswanathan, 
supra note 19, at 275–79; Paul G. Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to Agency Problems, 
62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1047, 1104 n.220 (1995) (“It is not universally accepted that manipulation of secu-
rities prices can be a profitable strategy.”); Stephen Craig Pirrong, The Self-Regulation of Commodity 
Exchanges: The Case of Market Manipulation, 38 J.L. & ECON. 141, 142–43 (1995); Thel, supra note 
18, at 219–24; see also Markowski v. SEC., 274 F.3d 525, 528 (7th Cir. 2001) (“[M]anipulation 
schemes, in which the manipulator simply buys a security in order to induce higher prices and then 
sells to take advantage of the price change, are likely to fail.” (citing Fischel & Ross, supra note 12)); 
Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. SEC., 187 F.3d 713, 725 (7th Cir. 1999) (“Whether even single-stock options 
and futures on physical commodities are subject to (reliably profitable) manipulation is an interesting 
question . . . .” (citing Fischel & Ross, supra note 12)). 
 49 See, e.g., Thel, supra note 18, at 219–24; see also Robert A. Jarrow et al., Market Manipulation 
and Corporate Finance: A New Perspective, 22 FIN. MGMT. 200, 203–08 (1993) (reviewing models 
of manipulation); Zhi-Qiang Jiang et al., Trading Networks, Abnormal Motifs and Stock Manipula-
tion, 1 QUANTITATIVE FIN. LETTERS 1, 1–2 (2013) (“[T]rade-based manipulation is easier to conduct 
and thus more common . . . .”); Donald C. Langevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits of the Stock Mar-
kets: A Behavioral Approach to Securities Regulation, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 135, 161 (2002) (“Behav-
ioral finance gives ample reason to suspect that trade-based schemes can succeed . . . .”). 
 50 See, e.g., Franklin Allen & Gary Gorton, Stock Price Manipulation, Market Microstructure, 
and Asymmetric Information, 36 EUR. ECON. REV. 624, 624–25 (1992) (sales move prices less than 
purchases); William Goetzmann et al., Portfolio Performance Manipulation and Manipulation-Proof 
Performance Measures, 20 REV. FIN. STUD. 1503, 1503–08 (2007) (discussing conditions for manipu-
lation of performance measures); Robert A. Jarrow, Market Manipulation, Bubbles, Corners, and 
Short-Squeezes, 27 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 311, 311–13 (1992). For further discussion on 
these kinds of theoretical models, see generally Putniņš, supra note 12. 
 51 See, e.g., Mark M. Carhart et al., Leaning for the Tape: Evidence of Gaming Behavior in Equity 
Mutual Funds, 57 J. FIN. 661, 661–63 (2002) (price changes at end of certain days suggest manipula-
tion by fund managers); Carole Comerton-Forde & Talis J. Putniņš, Stock Price Manipulation: Preva-
lence and Determinants, 17 REV. FIN. 1, 4 (finding that for each prosecuted manipulation, more than 
three hundred instances go unaddressed); D.R. Gallagher et al., Portfolio Pumping: An Examination of 
Investment Manager Quarter-End Trading and Impact on Performance, 17 PACIFIC-BASIN FIN. J. 1, 
2–3 (2009) (fund manager performance predicts manipulation); Pierre Hillion & Matti Suominen, The 
Manipulation of Closing Prices, 7 J. FIN. MARKETS 351, 351–53 (2004) (trading irregularities on 
Paris Bourse suggest manipulation); Sophie X. Ni et al., Stock Price Clustering on Option Expiration 
Dates, 78 J. FIN. ECON. 49, 50–53 (2005) (finding stock prices tend to converge at the strike price of 
associated derivatives at the expiration of those derivatives, suggesting manipulation). 
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ket price. For example, losses incurred from manipulating the price of a stock 
might be more than recovered from gains on financial derivatives betting that 
the stock price will be within or without a certain range.52 
Still, each of these scholars shares important assumptions with the skep-
tics: A manipulator’s goal is to affect the overall market price, which he or she 
does by trading an enormous portion of the asset.53 What separates these 
scholars from the skeptics is their belief that these hurdles can be cleared and 
that there exist a reasonably large number of cases where such a manipulation 
would be profitable.54 But, as the next Part shows, the real manipulative oppor-
tunities emerge only after relaxing the assumptions that artificial price is the 
goal and that buying a large percentage of the total supply is the means. 
II. THE MECHANICS OF BENCHMARK MANIPULATION 
It is costly and difficult to move the worldwide price of an asset, but ma-
nipulators need not target the price as such. For most purposes, the “price” of 
                                                                                                                           
 52 See Craig Pirrong, Energy Market Manipulation: Definition, Diagnosis, and Deterrence, 31 
ENERGY L.J. 1, 3–6 (discussing various manipulative trading strategies, including “squeezes” and 
“corners”); see also Fischel & Ross, supra note 12, at 523 (stating that contract-based manipulation is 
not as self-deterring as other forms of manipulation); Fox et al., supra note 48, at 654 (contract ma-
nipulation allows manipulator to “profit handsomely”). See generally Andrew N. Kleit, Index Manipu-
lation, the CFTC, and the Inanity of DiPlacido, (Feb. 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://ploneprod.met.psu.edu/people/ank1/research-papers/kleit.manipulation.pdf, archived at https://
perma.cc/FQ4R-X4D9?type=pdf (describing manipulation in commodities markets that require ma-
nipulators to achieve gains from futures contracts that outweigh the cost of unloading their position). 
These accounts imagine that money can be made in the futures market to offset what is lost in the 
physical market. It is important to see that this is not coextensive with benchmark manipulation. First, 
those accounts contemplate the manipulator going to the physical market as a whole, although the 
benchmark manipulator strategically locates trades within the tiny slice observed by the benchmark. 
Second, many non-futures contracts, including spot contracts, cite benchmarks. Therefore, the phe-
nomenon is more general than these accounts assume. Third, the relationship between spot prices and 
futures is often complex. In many markets, spot prices are best manipulated (perhaps in order to influ-
ence futures prices) by forgoing physical assets and instead buying other futures contracts. This is 
because some benchmarks of spot transactions infer extensive from futures markets.  
 53 For example, Kumar and Seppi’s model contemplates the manipulator profiting from payoffs 
from futures contracts. See Praveen Kumar & Duane Seppi, Futures Manipulation with Cash Settle-
ment, 47 J. FIN. 1485, 1487 (1992). Kumar and Seppi assert that the futures payoff is based on “the 
prevailing spot price,” and there is no suggestion that market prices generally could differ from prices 
for the purposes of the futures contract. Id. They seem to imply that the prices used to settle futures 
contracts can be drawn directly from market prices without discretion or distortion. See id. By contrast 
benchmark manipulation is possible because contracts seldom incorporate prevailing spot prices, and 
the proxies actually referenced are often drawn from only a subset of trading venues, traders, and 
times. See Kyle & Viswanathan, supra note 19, at 274 (excluding price quotation distortions designed 
to influence cash-settled prices from the definition of manipulation, “since effects are not market-
wide”). 
 54 This Article does not seek to resolve the broad debate on the viability of price manipulation, 
nor need it: the possibility of benchmark manipulation constitutes an alternative means of manipula-
tion. This argument is therefore partially independent of that debate. 
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an asset is conflated with “the price according to a leading benchmark.” Tam-
pering with a benchmark is far easier and can have an equivalent impact to 
actually moving the real price of the asset. This section explains the mechanics 
of benchmark manipulation. 
Market manipulation by way of a benchmark hinges on two general fea-
tures of the benchmark. First, the degree to which it is hardwired into legal 
documents. If benchmarks were just information, participants would be free to 
disregard them when they diverge from the “real” price. But integration into 
contracts and laws renders the benchmark dispositive as a price. Section A ex-
plains hardwiring of benchmarks by contrasting it to “soft” or merely informa-
tional uses. 
The second relevant feature is benchmarks’ susceptibility to bias. As Sec-
tion B shows, benchmarks represent market prices but they are not identical 
with them. The benchmark may diverge from reality by accident, or because 
individuals decide to influence it. Susceptibility is largely a function of the 
voluntariness afforded participants,55 and the relative concentration of the 
benchmark’s sample data.  
A. Hardwiring 
To understand hardwiring, it is first necessary to contrast it to informa-
tional or “soft” benchmark use. Price benchmarks are numerical summaries of 
market prices, and they are widely used to help individuals and entities make 
good decisions in an opaque and uncertain world. Examples of these bench-
marks, and their uses, abound. A renter might consult the current Prime Rate to 
decide whether now is a good time to buy a house. An investor might compare 
her mutual fund’s returns to the S&P 500 as she decides whether to ditch it. An 
employee might cite the Consumer Price Index as he negotiates for a raise. 
Consulting benchmarks is rational. We often want to know “the price” of 
some asset, but markets can be opaque and complex. There are substantial 
economies of scale in price discovery.56 By centralizing this function in a 
benchmark provider, each user need only pay some share of the cost. Bench-
mark providers research markets, observe trends, identify recent transactions, 
and synthesize the totality into a single comprehensible number. 
When individuals look to a benchmark to understand market conditions, 
benchmarks serve an informational function.57 Use of benchmarks for infor-
                                                                                                                           
 55 If most of the benchmark’s data is coming from users who can strategically decide what data to 
provide, then it will come as no surprise if results are biased. 
 56 Gabriel Rauterberg & Andrew Verstein, Index Theory: The Law, Promise and Failure of Fi-
nancial Indices, 30 YALE J. ON REG. 101, 112–14 (2013). 
 57 Id. 
226 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 56:215 
mation is a sort of “soft” benchmark application because users must still de-
cide how to use this information: will they trust it, reject it, or add it to the total 
mix of other data? 
While soft benchmark use is important, “hard” applications of bench-
marks, in which the benchmark is directly integrated into a legal relationship, 
are of arguably greater significance.58 Hardwiring by private parties generally 
occurs in the form of a contract. By lodging a benchmark within a promise, 
promisors can make agreements that are both flexible and unambiguous.59 
Benchmarks are extremely common as price terms in long-term con-
tracts.60 Industrial groups use variable prices, which frequently cite a promi-
nent financial benchmark, to control risk and improve the efficiency of their 
interactions.61 Labor unions negotiate salary escalator clauses for their em-
ployers, incorporating CPI into long-term employment arrangements.62 Estab-
lishing an enduring and impartial pricing scheme improves trust, lowers trans-
action and litigation costs, and encourages parties to make efficient invest-
ments in the relationship.63 
Benchmarks are utterly essential to the operation of financial deriva-
tives.64 Derivative contracts, such as call options and futures contracts, are fi-
nancial assets that derive their value from the value of some other asset. Deriv-
atives markets are thought to enable price discovery, allow risk-transfer, and 
reduce volatility.65 Any financial derivative’s payment condition—where the 
rubber hits the road—is likely to cite a financial benchmark. It is unheard of 
for a derivative on, say, aluminum to entitle its owner to profit if “the price of 
aluminum” should go up on a certain day. But a similar contract that hinges on 
                                                                                                                           
 58 For a discussion on how hard applications can also be called “stipulative” uses, see generally 
Andrew Verstein, When Prices Fail: Judicial Intervention in Long-Term Contracts (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author). 
 59 See Andrew Verstein, Ex Tempore Contracting, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1869, 1924 n.289 
(2014); see also Verstein, supra note 58.  
 60 Cf. Rauterberg & Verstein, supra note 56, at 108–12 (describing contractual use of indices). 
See generally Verstein, supra note 58. Note, however, that indices are not limited to long-term con-
tracts, because many spot contracts also cite index values. Putting a Price on Energy: International 
Price Mechanisms for Oil & Gas, ENERGY CHARTER SECRETARIAT 79–80 (Mar. 1, 2007), 
http://www.encharter.org/fileadmin/user_upload/document/Oil_and_Gas_Pricing_2007_ENG.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/LX6U-M424. 
 61 Rauterberg & Verstein, supra note 56, at 112–14. 
 62 Id., at 110. 
 63 See id., at 109–14. 
 64 See id., at 111–12. 
 65 See Cargill, Inc. v. Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154, 1173 (8th Cir. 1971). 
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changes in “LME Official Cash Settlement Prices” of aluminum would be 
quite ordinary.66 
Public bodies also hardwire benchmarks. They do so for similar reasons 
to private hardwiring. By selecting an expert, disinterested benchmark provid-
ers can allow public bodies to clearly, consistently, and trustworthily com-
municate their intentions, and to obtain rational prices despite their lack of ex-
pertise in the subject matter.67 As a result, statutes and administrative regula-
tions commonly cite particular benchmarks by name. For example, the State of 
Alaska uses the benchmarks of one company, Platts, as the base from which oil 
tax and royalty payments are calculated.68 
The law often imposes benchmarks upon private actors, publicly endors-
ing private hardwiring. It is common for regulations to require private actors to 
use benchmarks. For example, exchange traded funds obtain broad exemptions 
from the regulations applicable to mutual funds, provided that they are based 
upon a third-party benchmark;69 mortgages and other contracts obtain negotia-
bility more easily if drafted to reference to a benchmark;70 ERISA conditions 
the ability of fiduciaries to self-deal in currency trades for the retirement plans 
                                                                                                                           
 66 LMEswaps Swaps Contract Specifications, LONDON METAL EXCHANGE, http://www.
lme.com/metals/non-ferrous/aluminium/contract-specifications/lmeswaps/, archived at http://perma.
cc/Q6EE-LGSV (last visited Dec. 28, 2014). 
 67 Mandating use of a benchmark can also reflect the paternalistic desire to ensure a given trans-
action meets market standards, or it can reflect administrability considerations. A benchmark require-
ment relieves law enforcers from establishing the relevant standard at trial. 
 68 ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 11, § 25.200(i) (2013) (designating Platts Oilgram Price Report as 
the recognized price of fuel expense.); ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 15, § 55.171(m) (2013); BD. OF THE 
INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, PRINCIPLES FOR OIL PRICE REPORTING AGENCIES 4 (2013), available 
at http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/csrc_en/affairs/AffairsIOSCO/201210/ P0201210 10499030150053.
pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/F4VP-9BXA. Similar policies abound where the government is a 
buyer of commodities. See, e.g., Behm Family Corp. v. Dept. of Energy, 903 F.2d 830, 834 (Temp. 
Emer. Ct. App. 1990) (“Indeed, the [Department of Energy’s Office of Hearings and Appeals] has 
consistently and standardly used Platt’s in its market comparisons . . . .”). Those policies also exist 
where the government seeks to regulate the prices that public utilities charge to customers. See gener-
ally Natural Gas Purchase Incentive Regulation and Benchmarking, STATE UTIL. FORECASTING GRP. 
& PURDUE UNIV. (July 2005) [hereinafter Natural Gas Purchase Benchmarking] (discussing incentive 
payment schemes based upon third party indices—many of which are mentioned by name). 
 69 See Application for Exemption Under Section 6(c) at 21–22, Guggenheim Funds Inv. Advisors, 
LLC (Dec.15, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1167303/0000891804
11005522/gugg53122-40app.html, archived at http://perma.cc/ZT43-XFJ7 (discussing need for third-
party index provision); Exchange-Traded Funds, 73 Fed. Reg. 14,618 (proposed Mar. 8, 2008) (to be 
codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 239, 270, 274) (would have codified existing exemptions). 
 70 Compare U.C.C. § 3-104(1)(b) (1989) (requiring “a sum certain” that has been interpreted to 
permit variable rates only if produced by a verifiable and objective third party provider, prior to 1990 
revision), with U.C.C.§ 3-104 (2012) (permitting negotiability if obligation is for a “fixed amount of 
money,” after 1990 revision). 
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they supervise on limiting their prices by the relevant benchmark;71 federal law 
requires natural gas prices to be “fair and reasonable,” but prices linked to a 
market benchmark are presumptively valid.72 
The line between public and private hardwiring can blur as overlapping and 
interlocking uses interact.73 Consider the chain by which milk gets its price.74 
Milk futures contracts, derivative bets on the price of milk, are hardwired to de-
rive their price from U.S. Department of Agriculture minimum milk price. That 
number is derived almost entirely from the price that surveyed dairy farmers re-
port being paid. Those farmers overwhelmingly sell with long-term contracts 
that hardwire the price of cheddar cheese reported on the Chicago Mercantile 
Exchange. Therefore, a few cheese mongers in Chicago set the price of milk 
across the nation through a byzantine process that defies easy characterization as 
public or private. 
Users may have some choice of whether and which benchmark to use, but 
they thereafter lose some autonomy as to the implications of the benchmark’s 
movements. When legal documents reference a benchmark, the benchmark 
does more than inform about a price, it constitutes the price.75 This creates the 
                                                                                                                           
 71 29 U.S.C. §§ 1106, 1108 (2012). Sometimes the government will require the creation of an 
impartial index. See Regulation NMS, 70 Fed. Reg. 37,496 (June 29, 2005) (to be codified at 17 
C.F.R. pts. 200, 201, 230, 240, 242, 249, 270) (requiring brokers to execute trades for their clients at 
or better than an official index of transactions). 
 72 Cf. Medco Energi US, LLC v. Sea Robin Pipeline Co., 729 F.3d 394, 398 (5th Cir. 2013) (ex-
plaining that price benchmarks approved by a regulatory body is “per se reasonable and unassailable 
in judicial proceedings”).  
 73 Another example would be the public appropriation of private soft uses of indices. Financial insti-
tutions’ internal assessments of risk often integrate market benchmarks, such as LIBOR. Myra R. Val-
ladares, Rate Manipulators May Distort Banks’ Market Risk Models, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2014, http://
dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/06/25/rate-manipulations-may-distort-banks-market-risk-models/?_php=
true&_type=blogs&_r=0, archived at https://perma.cc/R5VA-WAYF?type=pdf. These internal rates can 
then be hardwired into regulatory processes. See generally Jonathan Macey, The Regulator Effect in 
Financial Regulation, 98 CORNEL L. REV. 591 (2013) (discussing instances where devices and institu-
tions developed by private market participants are adopted into the law via regulations, as were credit 
rating agencies).  
 74 See generally U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-07-707, Spot Cheese Market: Market 
Oversight Has Increased, but Concerns Remain about Potential Manipulation (2007) (discussing 
how the spot cheese market, which is a primary component of the USDA minimum milk pricing 
formula, is susceptible to market manipulation). Perhaps it is no surprise that the dairy market has 
been rocked by manipulation given the allegations of other market abuses. See Anderson v. Dairy 
Farmers of Am., Inc., No. 08-4726, 2010 WL 3893601, at *1 (D. Minn. 2010) (denying defendant’s 
motion to dismiss, and for interlocutory appeal); Louis F. Burke, Civil Litigation Developments: 
Class Actions Alleging Manipulation, 2013 A.B.A. Sec. Litig. 2–3, available at http://www.
americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/litigation/materials/sac2013/sac_2013/1_CFTC_
future.authcheckdam.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/3D4Q-WK3M (explaining that Anderson 
settled for undisclosed sum). 
 75 Contractual stipulation collapses the distinction between the price proxy and the price itself, the 
signifier and the signified. Cf. CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE, Some Consequences of Four Incapacities, 
in 5 COLLECTED PAPERS OF CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE 156, 172 (Charles Hartshorne & Paul Weiss 
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risk that the benchmark may go far afield, while remaining legally dispositive, 
to the detriment of one or more parties. Most first-year contract students learn 
this lesson from the 1975 Florida District Court case, Gulf Oil v. Eastern Air-
lines.76 In that case, a fuel oil seller agreed to a long-term contract utilizing a 
leading industry benchmark (Platts’s West Texas Sour Posted Price) for the 
price term. Some years into the contract, after substantial deregulation and in-
ternational shortages had sent the market price of oil soaring, the Platts price 
remained low. Gulf Oil complained that it was stuck filling Eastern Airlines’s 
fuel tanks for less than half of the real price. Despite heavy losses from the 
surprising divergence, and despite arguments persuasive to many that the price 
benchmark really had become inaccurate,77 Gulf Oil was held to their con-
tract.78 The benchmark price had preempted the price. 
Hardwiring interfaces benchmarks with legal obligations, providing a 
channel by which a manipulator can profit. A manipulator can profit from bias-
ing a benchmark in a number of circumstances: establishing a speculative posi-
tion with financial derivatives nearing expiration;79 contracting to buy or sell 
an asset at some floating price;80 linking compensation for services to a 
benchmark;81 varying legal price limits linked to a benchmark.82 
A benchmark is to price what a credit rating agency is to quality. People 
have long looked to credit rating agencies, such as Moody’s and S&P, to in-
form them about the safety of certain investments. That information is a soft 
use. But credit rating agencies became most interesting, important, and de-
structive when their ratings were hardwired into various legal requirements.83 
Rather than requiring banks and insurance companies to hold “safe” assets 
(which they might find with the help of the bond ratings), regulators required 
them to hold highly-rated assets.84 Once the rating was hardwired into a law or 
contract, it ceased to be a proxy for quality and became legally dispositive of 
quality; a triple-A rated mortgage backed security was officially safe even if 
                                                                                                                           
eds. 1958) (stating that signs only become such when we invest them with meaning). Hard uses of 
benchmarks undermine soft uses. The more parties stipulate using a benchmark, the less opportunity 
to make judgments on the basis of the benchmark. 
 76 415 F. Supp. 429, 432 (S.D. Fla. 1975). 
 77 Id. at 432–44 (describing how the benchmarks diverged and could be considered inaccurate). 
 78 Id. at 443. 
 79 See e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n. v. Delay, No. 7:05CV5026, 2006 WL 
3359076, at *1–3 (D. Neb. 2006). 
 80 SEC v. Masri, 523 F. Supp. 2d 361, 363–65 (S.D.N.Y 2007). 
 81 Carhart et al., supra note 51, at 666; Gallagher et al., supra note 51, at 2–3. 
 82 See Natural Gas Purchase Benchmarking, supra note 68, at 12–23. 
 83 See generally Jeffrey Manns, Downgrading Rating Agency Reform, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
749, 754–61 (2013) (describing law’s prioritization of ratings, and resultant problems). 
 84 Id. at 757–58. 
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plenty of other news implied that it was unsafe. The financial crisis of 2008 
may have been largely caused by hardwiring of credit ratings.85 
Likewise, a biased benchmark influences the operation of the hardwired le-
gal document even if everyone knows that it is biased. Unlike soft benchmark 
use, hard uses expose users to the risk of bias even apart from any continued re-
liance. It is therefore imperative to ask: are price benchmarks susceptible to bias? 
B. Susceptibility to Bias 
Price benchmarks are generally easier to manipulate than the prices they 
represent. Two factors—concentration and voluntariness—greatly influence 
the potential for bias. 
1. Concentration 
Benchmarks attempt to summarize a whole market from a subset of mar-
ket information. This is reasonable. Benchmarks are most vital where it is in-
feasible to observe and consider every transaction and trend. Yet any approach 
that uses only a portion of market data gives outsized influence to those in-
cluded data. By chance or design, a small market trend may appear large if it is 
localized entirely within the benchmark’s dataset. As every social scientist 
knows, it is far easier to bias a sample than change a population. 
A benchmark can exhibit three forms of concentration. First, “domain 
concentration” refers to how much of the plausible market is included in the 
benchmark’s dataset. If a benchmark of corn utilized all corn prices, it would 
be essentially as hard to manipulate as the entire corn market. Conversely, a 
benchmark derived from transactions in a single ear of corn would be easily 
manipulated. While all benchmarks must draw lines between included and ex-
cluded data, robustness is endangered if the provider needlessly limits the da-
ta.86 While it might seem that arbitragers would quickly equalize the prices 
within and without the benchmark’s domain of data, barriers to arbitrage can 
                                                                                                                           
 85 See id. at 754 (“A broad consensus exists that rating agencies played a central role in the finan-
cial crisis . . . because a myriad of federal and state statutes and regulations deputize rating agencies as 
gatekeepers of credit risk.”). 
 86 For example LIBOR provided rates for the cost to borrow various currencies for various dura-
tions. The cost of borrowing Swedish Krona for seven months should look exactly like the cost of 
borrowing USD for seven months, plus a currency conversion fee. Yet, the British Bankers Associa-
tion (BBA) explicitly instructed users not to utilize this methodology—they had to calculate the cost 
of borrowing directly. See Definitions, BRITISH BANKERS ASS’N, http://www.bbalibor.com/
explained/definitions, archived at http://perma.cc/FL7V-5HBS (last visited Dec. 29, 2014). This 
methodological tunnel vision rendered each tenor of the benchmark less robust.  
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allow the included data to become orphaned from the market it is supposed to 
represent.87 
A second form of concentration, “participant concentration,” refers to the 
composition of traders operating within the benchmark’s domain. If only a few 
buyers and sellers dominate the trading observed by the benchmark, those few 
traders will have outsized influence over the benchmark rate.88 We know to be 
skeptical of a market in which just a few traders, perhaps acquainted, effective-
ly pass assets back and forth to one another. Conversely, even a relatively 
small domain of eligible transactions may be robust against bias if a large 
number of traders are at work.89 
A third form of concentration, “liquidity concentration,” refers to the 
amount and ease of trading within the benchmark’s domain. If a large number 
of trades take place within the domain, and if large trades tend to only slightly 
move the price, then the benchmark may be relatively robust. Nevertheless, 
even a benchmark with a large domain and many traders may be subject to 
influence if few trades actually take place. Then, the rare trade may effectively 
set the price. 
2. Voluntariness 
Biased samples may prove benign if the biases are distributed by chance. 
Many benchmarks, however, permit users to deliberately contribute (or omit) 
data to the sample, gaining strategic influence over the result. There are three 
possible methods for exercising such influence. First, the would-be manipula-
tor can make, or omit to make, additional trades of whatever sort the bench-
                                                                                                                           
 87 With perfect arbitrage, manipulation of the index’s domain would be no easier than the market 
as a whole. Market opacity—with resulting information asymmetries—can reduce arbitrage. See, e.g., 
Kevin H.K. Cheng et al., How Electronic Trading Affects Bid-Ask Spreads and Arbitrage Efficiency 
Between Index Futures and Options, 25 J. FUTURES MARKETS 375, 377 (2005); Praveen Kumar & 
Duane Seppi, Futures Manipulation with Cash Settlement 47 J. FIN. 1485, 1495–96 (1992); Vladimir 
Atanasov et al., Financial Intermediaries in the Midst of Market Manipulation: Did They Protect the 
Fool or Help the Knave?, FIN. MKT. MISCONDUCT CONFERENCE 28 (Feb. 26 2014), http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=240870 archived at http://perma.cc/A94X-3C55. Second, prac-
tical considerations and costs can reduce arbitrage correction. And apart from any frictions, there is 
extensive scholarship in the behavioral economics literature discussing psychological factors that may 
lead to persistent—even glaring—reluctance of prices to properly converge. See generally Andrei 
Schleifer & Robert W. Vishny, The Limits of Arbitrage, 52 J. FIN. 35 (1997) (modeling the effects of 
factors that hinder traditional arbitrage). 
 88 It is common to think that participant concentration requires a few large traders. Pirrong, supra 
note 52, at 6 (“Only traders that are sufficiently large . . . profitably engage in such a manipulation.”). 
Yet one important way for participation to concentrate is for intermediaries to aggregate the trades of 
many customers. Then the nominally large trader is really the broker or hedged-dealer for many indi-
rect participants. 
 89 For example, the ABX, an index of mortgage backed securities, tracks only a tiny basket of 
securities, but it is extensively traded. 
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mark tabulates.90 Because the choice of whether to trade is voluntary, the 
paired reporting of the trade becomes voluntary. 
Second, the manipulator can fabricate trading data. She can lie to the 
benchmark provider, reporting a fictitious trade.91 Such frauds are sometimes 
documented through trades lacking in economic substance, such as a sale at a 
low price to a friend who has committed to sell back to you at the same price a 
few minutes later.92 In some cases, mere indications of interest—rather than a 
subsequent trade—are enough to influence the benchmark, but these too can be 
fraudulent.93 
A third technique involves exercising discretionary control over bench-
mark data without fibbing or making additional trades. Some benchmarks ex-
plicitly permit traders to decide whether or not to submit information relating 
to trades. Other benchmarks effectively permit strategic submission by ignor-
ing trade data generated in certain venues. By deciding whether to report 
trades, or whether to trade in a venue the index ignores, traders can influence 
the index without really changing their trading behavior or lying. For example, 
a trader may trade at exactly the same prices on Monday and Tuesday, but the 
benchmark price may differ because she neglects to report her Monday trades. 
Because this third form of manipulation takes place without necessarily 
making new trades, transactions and holding costs described in Part I would 
not apply, and a major challenge to manipulation would be avoided. That 
makes the third technique more attractive than the first technique. 
It possesses another key attraction. The first two techniques—new trades 
motivated to move prices, or fraud—are certainly illegal.94 The third technique 
however, is arguably not illegal.95 In the words of the International Organiza-
tion of Securities Commissions, an association of the world’s market regula-
tors, “[t]here is no contractual, legal or regulatory requirement to report . . . 
                                                                                                                           
 90 See SEC v. Masri, 523 F. Supp. 2d 361, 363–65 (S.D.N.Y 2007) (describing where a trader 
made aggressive purchases during the last ten minutes of the trading day in order to affect the closing 
price, which operates like a benchmark); see also Christopher Louis Pia, CFTC No. 11-17, 2011 WL 
3228315, at *2 (Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n July 25, 2011) (describing where a portfolio 
manager executed buy orders for futures contracts in the last ten seconds of the closing period in an 
effort to exert upward pressure on the settlement prices). 
 91 In re Natural Gas Commodity Litig., 358 F. Supp. 2d 336, 344–45 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (finding 
that allegations that defendants knowingly delivered false reports to trade publications were sufficient 
to state a Commodity Exchange Act claim). 
 92 Market abuse statutes prohibit such “accommodation” trades and “wash” trades.  
 93 See Greg Scopino, The (Questionable) Legality of High-Speed “Pinging” and “Front-
Running” in the Futures Markets, 47 CONN. L. REV. (forthcoming Spring 2015) (manuscript at 55–56) 
(discussing two cases where traders placed large orders, and subsequently cancelled them, in order to 
see the effect on a market benchmark and discern the demand for commodity futures at different price 
levels). 
 94 See infra notes 203–269 and accompanying text. 
 95 See infra notes 203–269 and accompanying text.  
2015] Benchmark Manipulation 233 
transactions to [benchmark providers]. It is therefore open to companies to re-
port only those deals that are in their own best interests for the rest of the mar-
ket to see.”96 
 As one generates price data through trading, one generally gains a 
workable option to impact or not impact the price term in the many bench-
mark-reliant contracts. Within its confines, strategic submission presents a ma-
nipulative opportunity with little of the costs emphasized by manipulation 
skeptics or the risks of legal enforcement. 
III. EXAMPLES OF BENCHMARK MANIPULATION 
The previous Part identified the general features that render markets and 
their benchmarks prone to benchmark manipulation. This Part applies those 
insights to examples from three different markets to show that the insights are 
illuminative of the prevalence of manipulation risk in our economy. 
A. Currency 
It has been argued that manipulation of the market for U.S. Treasury 
bonds should be virtually impossible because of its large size.97 The market for 
exchanging foreign currency, such as Euros for Yen, is about ten times as 
large.98 If ever there were a market too large to manipulate, it should be the $5 
trillion a day foreign exchange market.99 
And yet, foreign exchange is the epicenter of wild manipulation by mar-
ket insiders.100 Britain’s’ chief market regulator recently called it the “biggest 
                                                                                                                           
 96 INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS ET AL., OIL PRICE REPORTING AGENCIES 13 (Oct. 2011), avail-
able at http://www.iea.org/media/g20/4_2011_Oil_Price_Reporting_Agencies.pdf, archived at http://
perma.cc/CZ2Y-E3LE. Generally, price-reporting agencies of all commodities are amenable to strate-
gic data submission. Some have suggested that Regulation FD, an SEC rule regarding reporting obli-
gations, and relevant provisions of Sarbanes Oxley might limit strategic disclosure, but that is not a 
natural inference from either document. See Bassam Fattouh, An Anatomy of the Crude Oil Pricing 
System, OXFORD INST. FOR ENERGY STUD., Jan. 2011, at 33, available at http://www.oxfordenergy.
org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/WPM40-AnAnatomyoftheCrudeOilPricingSystem-Bassam
Fattouh-2011.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/8N98-KRS2. 
 97 Fischel & Ross, supra note 12, at 547. 
 98 Compare Rime & Schrimpf, surpa note 2, at 27 (FX trading about $5 trillion per day), with US 
Bond Market Trading Volume, SIFMA, http://www.sifma.org/research/statistics.aspx, archived at 
http://perma.cc/6PS5-GMP3 (last visited Dec. 29, 2014) (updating monthly data and noting that the 
total trading in Oct. 2014 was approximately $791.9 billion). 
 99 Rime & Schrimpf, supra note 2, at 27. 
 100 See, e.g., In re Citibank, N.A., CFTC No. 15-03 (Nov., 11, 2014), http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/
groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/legalpleading/enfcitibankorder111114.pdf, archived 
at http://perma.cc/V7NG-6E22 (banks strategically offset some position outside of the polled window 
and venue); Swiss Finance Ministry Retracts Comments on Forex Market Rigging, REUTERS (Oct. 9, 
2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/09/swiss-forex-idUSL6N0HZ1UI20131009, archived 
at http://perma.cc/BKZ3-TPEJ (quoting Switzerland’s Finance Minister) (“It’s a fact that foreign 
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series of quantifiable wrongdoing in the history of our financial services indus-
try.”101 Dozens of people have lost their jobs,102 many billions of dollars in 
fines have already been paid,103 and regulators in many countries are gearing 
up for criminal prosecutions.104 Employees at major banks met in chat rooms 
with names such as “the cartel,” to swap their customers’ secrets in order to 
organize coordinated run-ups in the price of a currency just before one of those 
customers made a large purchase.105 By manipulating the price of the currency 
the customer needs, the customer gets a bad price and the trader gets a great 
one. Benchmark manipulation allowed these schemes to work where tradition-
al price manipulation would certainly fail.106 
                                                                                                                           
exchange manipulation was committed.”). Regulators in the UK, US, Switzerland, the EU, Singapore 
and Hong Kong have begun investigations. Christopher Matthews et al., 'Flipped' Bankers Aid U.S. in 
Foreign-Exchange Probe, WALL ST. J., Sept. 14, 2014, http://online.wsj.com/articles/flipped-bankers-
aid-u-s-in-foreign-exchange-probe-1410733662, archived at https://perma.cc/WK5Y-XS6L?type=pdf; 
Anjani Trivedi, Singapore Joins Global Currency-Market Probe, WALL ST. J., Oct. 24, 2013, http://
online.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303615304579155080130234424, archived at https://
perma.cc/6W6U-JDJ3?type=pdf; EU Set to Act on Forex Manipulation Claims, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 7, 
2013, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/1215f8cc-2f6d-11e3-8b7e-00144feab7de.html#axzz2jmUjgc00, 
archived at https://perma.cc/BA8D-WM62?type=pdf; Rachel Armstrong, Hong Kong, New Zealand 
Investigate Banks for Alleged FX Manipulation, REUTERS (Apr. 1, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/
article/2014/04/01/us-hongkongforex-idUSBREA300AW20140401, archived at http://perma.cc/
L8QE-HGAJ. 
 101 Pam Martens, Top UK Regulator: People Have Good Reason Not to Trust Currency Rates Set 
by Big Banks, WALL ST. ON PARADE (Feb 5, 2014), http://wallstreetonparade.com/2014/02/top-uk-
regulator-people-have-good-reason-not-to-trust-currency-rates-set-by-big-banks/, archived at http://
perma.cc/EXH5-3U9P. 
 102 See, e.g., Martin Arnold, HSBC Fires Head of European Currency Trading, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 
10, 2014, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/77035b60-8059-11e4-9907-00144feabdc0.html, archived at 
https://perma.cc/7XM8-YBEK?type=pdf. 
 103 Suzi Ring et al., CitiGroup, JPMorgan to Pay Most in $4.3 Billion in FX in Rigging Cases, 
BLOOMBERG NEWS (Nov. 12, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-11-12/banks-to-pay-3-3-
billion-in-fx-manipulation-probe.html, archived at http://perma.cc/JY58-X4AQ; see also Gina Chon 
& Tom Braithwaite, JPMorgan Settles Forex Manipulation Lawsuit, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2015, 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/7c545192-9511-11e4-b32c-00144feabdc0.html?siteedition=intl, ar-
chived at https://perma.cc/7SVR-7NKW?type=pdf (civil settlement). 
 104 Jenny Anderson, Britain’s Serious Fraud Office Joins Extensive Foreign-Exchange Inquiry, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2014, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/07/21/another-british-regulator-joins-
extensive-foreign-exchange-inquiry/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0, archived at http://perma.cc/
WD6A-J49Y; Caroline Binham & Sam Fleming, Former Royal Bank of Scotland Trader Arrested in 
Forex Rigging Probe, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2014, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/6f46e024-87be-
11e4-9cd9-00144feabdc0.html, archived at https://perma.cc/57JR-URG2?type=pdf. 
 105 Jamie McGeever & Carmel Crimmins, Soft Touch FX Regulation Falls Under Harsh Glare, 
REUTERS (Mar. 7, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/07/us-britain-forex-manipulation-
insight-idUSBREA2617020140307, archived at http://perma.cc/2235-F9TW. 
 106 Nations also attempt to influence exchange rates as part of their monetary or trade policies. 
This Article does not discuss that phenomenon. This is essential to cabin the scope of the project. It is 
also appropriate because the sovereign manipulation is likely to differ in means, focusing on aggregate 
price level rather than the benchmark alone, and ends from private manipulations.  
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Despite its large size, manipulation in the foreign exchange market is pos-
sible because of the widespread dependence upon and hardwiring of bench-
marks that are susceptible to influence. The leading benchmarks of foreign 
currency exchange are derived from a tiny subset of trades. Specifically, the 
leading benchmarks are derived from trades mostly executed by a dozen so-
phisticated intermediaries during a narrow band of time, that are consciously 
submitted or omitted based on the effect on the benchmark. On the head of this 
pin dance all the angels of the world’s largest financial market. 
1. Hardwiring 
The most important benchmarks of currency prices are the WM/Reuters 
rates.107 Published by the World Markets Company and Thompson Reuters, 
these rates are derived from trades executed on Thompson Reuter’s electronic 
brokerage.108 They are calculated frequently, typically every half-hour—but 
the most important version is the one computed at 4pm London time.109 This 
edition, known simply as “the London Fix,” is what most people think of when 
they think of exchange rates.110 
This leading currency benchmark is extensively hardwired into legal rela-
tionships. WM/Reuters rates are used as settlement values for currency deriva-
tives both on111 and off exchanges,112 meaning that they largely determine the 
                                                                                                                           
 107 Foreign Exchange Benchmarks: Consultative Document, FIN. STABILITY BD., 1 (July 15, 2014) 
[hereinafter Foreign Exchange Benchmarks], http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/
r_140715.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/596F-WNHD. 
 108 Id. For certain “Trade Currencies,” data from other trading platforms (EBS and Currenex) is 
also incorporated. Id. at 3. But for nearly 140 of the 158 covered currencies—many of them the least 
liquid—only one platform’s data is consulted. See Spot & Forward Rates Methodology Guide, 
WM/REUTERS 3 (2010) [hereinafter Spot & Forward Rates Guide], http://www.wmcompany.com/
pdfs/026808.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/TB3C-F432. Throughout this discussion, matters are 
simplified by discussing benchmarks as though Reuters’ rates were the leaders in each currency pair. 
Similar issues arise for the currency pairs that are generally represented through another benchmark 
service. 
 109 Id. at 8. This is a great improvement over the early days of currency trading. One hundred 
years ago, trade rates were published only twice a week. JOHN ATKIN, THE FOREIGN EXCHANGE 
MARKET IN LONDON 6–7 (2005). Market participants continued trading throughout the week at rates 
that were different from, but based upon, those fairly symbolic rates. Id. 
 110 The FX Is in: Are Foreign-exchange Benchmarks the Latest to Be Manipulated by Bankers?, 
ECONOMIST, Oct. 12, 2013, at 88, 88. 
 111 Accelerated Rule Change Expanding OTC FX Swaps Clearing Offering, Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 34-65637, 76 Fed. Reg. 67,512, 67,513–14 (Nov. 1, 2011); Immediate Effectiveness of Rule 
Change Relating to Foreign Currency Options Closing Settlement Values, Release No. 34-60274 74 
Fed. Reg. 34,611, 34,611–12 (July 16, 2009).  
 112 OTC FX Clearing, CME GROUP, 8 (Nov. 2014), http://www.cmegroup.com/trading/fx/files/
otc-fx-clearing.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/8L3B-KFDC?type=pdf. 
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value of instruments worth some $3.3 trillion in daily trading.113 About two tril-
lion dollars more is traded in the “spot” market, and much of this trading will 
also hardwire the London Fix.114 As if five trillion dollars in daily transactions 
were not enough incorporation of the benchmarks, they are indirectly hardwired 
into many other benchmarks. For example, the Dow Jones Industrial Average, 
S&P 500, FTSE 100, and others equity indices all use the WM/Reuters bench-
marks to compute the value of stocks denominated in foreign currency.115 It is 
only a slight exaggeration to say that the leading currency benchmarks co-
determine almost all derivative prices. 
Investment funds, through which Americans save for retirement, hardwire 
currency benchmarks as well. Foreign investments are valued using the leading 
benchmarks for the purpose of computing the fund’s Net Asset Value. This 
value is then used to determine how much a mutual fund investor receives 
when selling back her shares. If this number is inaccurate, the fund could pay 
out more than the investor’s pro-rata share, thus violating the law and risking 
the stability of the fund. 
Widespread hardwiring gives trading banks an incentive to influence the 
benchmarks. If they place a bet on currency movements with a financial deriv-
ative, or commit to buy or sell currency in the future, the level of the bench-
mark determines whether they are a winner or loser. Recent manipulative alle-
gations concern spot trades with customers: the customer would contract to 
buy currency, with the price to be equal to the 4 p.m. London Fix.116 If traders 
could temporarily change the benchmark at that time, they could covertly 
overcharge their customers. But arguably greater opportunity exists in exploit-
ing the currency derivatives market, which is even larger than the spot mar-
ket.117 Large banks act as dealers of hedging transactions for big companies or 
speculative bets for investment funds. Winning such bets is a tempting prize 
for the successful manipulator. 
                                                                                                                           
 113 Triennial Central Bank Survey: Foreign Exchange Turnover in April 2013: Preliminary 
Global Results, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS 9 (Sept. 2013) [hereinafter Foreign Exchange Turno-
ver], http://www.bis.org/publ/rpfx13fx.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/SA7E-3U8P?type=pdf. 
 114 Id. 
 115 See Spot & Forward Rates Guide, supra note 108, at 10; see also Dow Jones Averages Meth-
odology, S&P DOW JONES INDICES 13 (Aug. 2013), https://www.djindexes.com/mdsidx/downloads/
meth_info/Dow_Jones_Industrial_Average_Methodology.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/2L22-
C85F?type=pdf (referencing DJIA’s use of WM/Reuters). 
 116 Vaughan et al., supra note 31. There do not appear to have been significant controls prohibit-
ing intra-firm communication about customer orders and the firm’s own positions. This is not a recent 
phenomenon. See G.C. Morris, The Role of the Foreign Exchange Department, in MANAGING A FOR-
EIGN EXCHANGE DEPARTMENT: A MANUAL OF EFFECTIVE PRACTICES 2–3, 5 (Rudi Weisweiller ed., 
1985) (describing casual intra-firm communication). 
 117 Foreign Exchange Turnover, supra note 113, at 13.  
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2. Susceptibility 
These leading benchmarks are susceptible to manipulation. Despite the 
vast size of the currency market, the slice incorporated by the leading bench-
marks is small and by no means representative. More importantly, strategic 
considerations can and do influence which data the benchmark actually incor-
porates. 
While leading benchmarks seeks to represent the market price for curren-
cy, numerous factors constrain the representativeness of the benchmark. 
Benchmark price is compiled from trades on Reuters’s platform, with limited 
recourse to other data.118 This venue captures some, but not all, of the trades 
between a dozen large banks (the “interdealer market”) and little else. 
Difficulties arise in part from the result of the structure of the currency 
market. This is not a market where many traders meet at a central and open 
exchange to directly trade on equal terms. Instead, “[t]he foreign exchange 
market in which the transactions occur is a decentralized or over-the-counter 
market, which means there is no central location for buyers and sellers of cur-
rencies to do business.”119 Further, the currency market is a “two-tiered” mar-
ket in which most parties trade with one of a few big banks, and those banks 
trade with one another on very different terms and for very different reasons. A 
stylized depiction of the market structure appears below. The intersection of 
the four banks is the interbank market (which sometimes called the wholesale 
market). Each bank also has a network of customers, just like Bank 4 does, 
which collectively constitutes the retail market. Banks tend to net these trades 
against one another, coming to the interbank tier in order to trade away any 
imbalances that nevertheless occur. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                           
 118 Spot & Forward Rates Guide, supra note 108, at 3. 
 119 La. Mun. Police Employees’ Ret. Sys. v. JPMorgan Chase, No. 12 Civ. 6659, 2013 WL 
3357173, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. July 3, 2013). 
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The interbank tier is essentially an invitation only market.120 Many users, 
such as multinational corporations, money managers, and ordinary individu-
als—who collectively make up almost a sixth of all currency trading volume—
are essentially absent.121 A large minimum volume, typically five million dol-
lars, is necessary to trade.122 Therefore, there are limits to the entry of new 
traders who might reduce the relative influence of the incumbent banks. The 
result is striking: the top four banks conduct 50.4% of customer volume.123 In 
the spot market (market for immediate delivery), ninety-eight percent of mar-
ket share goes to ten firms.124 Crucially, only transactions in this interdealer 
market count in determining currency benchmarks. 
It might be of little concern that the benchmark rate is deduced from only 
the trades of a few big banks if it were at least drawing from a representative 
slice of their trades. In reality, however, banks can control where they trade.125 
They are free to direct trades to electronic brokerages other than the Reuters 
platform, or to pick up the telephone and trade without any electronic system. 
And they frequently avail themselves of this freedom.126 
                                                                                                                           
 120 Although much of the market has become anonymous and electronic, the electronic systems 
still allow parties to designate which counterparties they trust. Only quotes from those parties are 
displayed on the screen. 
 121 CHEOL EUN & BRUCE RESNICK, INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 116 (6th ed. 
2007).  
 122 See ATKIN, supra note 109, at 159.  
 123 Peter Lee, FX Survey 2013: Deutsche Clings on Despite Citi’s Resurgence, EUROMONEY (May 
2013), http://www.euromoney.com/Article/3200845/FX-survey-2013-Deutsche-clings-on-despite-Citis-
resurgence.html, archived at http://perma.cc/UUD3-VXLP.  
 124 The Foreign Exchange and Interest Rate Derivatives Markets: Turnover in the United States 
FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y. 6 (Apr. 2013), http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/pdf/2013triennial
report.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/B7AS-GEXF. 
 125 Numerous non-manipulative purposes might lead a bank to trade away from the Reuters plat-
form. Trades through a bank’s proprietary electronic trading platform may permit the bank a superior 
execution price. Banks may also prefer to avoid bringing large trades to the Reuters platform in order 
to avoid giving valuable information to rival traders. They may also be concerned for counterparty 
risk—the chance that the other party becomes unable to honor their bargain because they have become 
insolvent. Trading through Reuters is anonymous. That may be fine for transactions under thirty mil-
lion dollars, but for larger sums, it can prove important to make sure that one’s trading partner is 
trustworthy enough to perform (and be in business) when it comes time to actually tender the curren-
cy. ATKIN, supra note 109, at 175. 
 126 High-Frequency Trading in the Foreign Exchange Market, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS 9 
(Sept. 2011), http://www.bis.org/publ/mktc05.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/FK2Q-4R2H?type=
pdf (“They can evade detection . . . by executing large flows in less transparent venues, including 
reverting to transacting bilaterally over the telephone.”); In re Citibank, N.A., CFTC No. 15-03 (Nov., 
11, 2014), http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/legalpleading/
enfcitibankorder111114.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/V7NG-6E22 (banks strategically offset some 
position outside of the polled window and venue). 
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As a result, only one sixth of trades by big banks end up on the electronic 
platforms that inform the benchmark price.127 And their big trades make up 
less than half of the total trading volume.128 The rest is settled in other venues, 
to which the benchmark is blind. Therefore the benchmark rates are being as-
sembled from far less than ten percent of the applicable market. 
Incorporated trades are also temporally circumscribed. Only trades made 
during designated periods are combined and reported as the rate. The period 
may be a one or two minute window per hour or half hour.129 Thus, the world’s 
most important currency rates are determined without reference to ninety-
seven percent of the day’s trading time.130 A trader who concentrates her trad-
ing within this short window stands a good chance of influencing the price for 
the next half hour—which may be an important half hour for the purpose of 
some hardwired use of the benchmark.131 
There are few markets in the world with such concentrated participation 
in the benchmark, but some of these trends are relatively recent. Rapid consol-
idation in the financial services sector has led to unprecedented concentration 
in the currency trading business.132 Sophisticated and deliberate efforts to off-
set customer trades means that banks can now net out a large portion of their 
customer trades against one another, limiting the number of trades that they 
                                                                                                                           
 127 Rime & Schrimpf, supra note 2, at 36. 
 128 Id. at 29 (thirty-nine percent in 2013, down from sixty-three percent in the late 1990s). 
 129 Spot & Forward Rates Guide, supra note 108, at 3. 
 130 These tend to be periods of high trading volume, in part because traders perceive greater safety 
in trading alongside others. Foreign Exchange Benchmarks, supra note 107, at 17. Likewise, hardwir-
ing benchmark users select the 4 p.m. fix because they perceive it to be safer, and the benchmark 
providers provide a 4 p.m. fix (rather than, say, a 3:45 p.m. fix) because they are trying to reach a 
period of concentrated trading. The status quo involves many actors trying to reduce risk and increase 
accuracy. Still, they are only able to improve things so much without appropriate regulatory assis-
tance. There is no assurance that these trades will be a majority of the hour’s transactions, nor that 
they will be representative of the prior and following trades. 
 131 Catherine Boyle, Forex Manipulation: How It Worked, CNBC (Mar. 11, 2014), http://www.
cnbc.com/id/101482959, archived at http://perma.cc/MVK9-9VXT (customer exploiting trades made 
in the last minutes before 4 p.m.). Note, however, that price impacts may well last longer than a few 
minutes. On lingering price impacts, see David Berger et al., Order Flow and Exchange Rate Dynam-
ics in Electronic Brokerage System Data, 75 J. INT’L ECON. 93, 108 (2008) (stating that the price 
impact can last up to two weeks); Martin Evans & Richard Lyons, Do Currency Markets Absorb News 
Quickly?, 24 J. INT’L MONEY & FIN. 197, 214–16 (2005) (stating the price impact lingers for several 
days). 
 132 See, e.g., Katie Martin, Deutsche Bank Wins Euromoney FX Poll, WALL ST. J., May 8, 2013, 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887324244304578471422221191246, archived at 
https://perma.cc/3S2A-U5LS?type=pdf (describing competition in becoming the world’s biggest cur-
rency dealing bank).  
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must offset in the interdealer market.133 Widespread benchmark dependence 
emerged at a time before trading became so concentrated.134 
Enormous volumes of customer order flow allow the dealer banks discre-
tion in how to deploy those trades. A bank receiving a large buy order from a 
customer might immediately recognize it through a trade in the interdealer 
market, or quietly trade it off to a hedge fund on similar terms,135 or (quieter 
still) just keep the trade on its own books.136 Acting as a broker or a dealer, the 
intermediary’s access to other people’s money gives it countless free options to 
decide whether the benchmark moves or stands still. 
Arbitrage possibilities are inhibited because of the interbank market’s ex-
clusivity as well as the market’s opacity. There is no single price for a given 
currency.137 Instead, prices depend on volume, trader identity, trade venue, and 
other factors. Although Reuters makes substantial quantities of data widely 
available, the best and fastest data streams are only available to paying sub-
scribers.138 As explained in a spate of recent lawsuits by pension funds charged 
baffling sums for trades, it is practically impossible for most market partici-
pants to discover how well their trades have been executed.139 Of equal im-
                                                                                                                           
 133 International Banking and Financial Market Developments, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS 
Q. REV., Dec. 2013, at 39 n.2 (stating that in major currency trades, such as USD to Euro, the internal-
ization rate may exceed seventy-five percent). 
 134 Although access and competition have grown in the FX market, the essential market structure 
remains two-tiered. Nowadays, large customers can purchase the right to trade in the interdealer mar-
ket through a “prime brokerage” agreement, in which they trade in the name of a well-established 
bank. For other customers, an increasing number of platforms exist to receive dealer quotes without 
consulting the interdealer market. Importantly, though these trends each deemphasize the principal 
banks’ importance in the interdealer market, these changes have nevertheless emphasized banks’ 
importance to the market as a whole. This is because non-bank access to the interdealer market has 
largely occurred through the traditional banks.  
 135 Carol Osler et al., Price Discovery in Currency Markets, 30 J. INT’L MONEY & FIN. 1696, 
1697 (2005) (suggesting banks offer informed financial customers narrower spreads). 
 136 Frank McGroarty et al., Microstructure Effects, Volatility in the Spot Foreign Exchange Mar-
ket Pre and Post-EMU, 17 GLOBAL FIN. J. 23, 28–29 (2006) (“Transactions between FX banks and 
their customers are bilateral and are not visible to other banks. So, the other banks cannot use the 
buy/sell information of this trade to update their prices.”). 
 137 La. Mun. Police Employees’ Ret. Sys., 2013 WL 3357173, at *10. 
 138 On the impact of these terminals, see ATKIN, supra note 109, at 149, 151. 
 139 See La. Mun. Police Employees’ Ret. Sys., 2013 WL 3357173, at *10–11; Stationary Engi-
neers Local 39 Pension Trust Fund v. Bank of New York, No. C 11-03620, 2012 WL 476526, at *1–2 
(N.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2012). As is typical, the banks promised their clients “No Transaction Fees . . . 
[for] custody and accounting [services].” La. Mun. Police Employees’ Ret. Sys., 2013 WL 3357173, at 
*7. Yet, those same contracts often specify that the bank can execute currency transactions within a 
certain price range without getting a client’s approval in a given transaction. Id. at *7–8. In practice, 
banks set the price of the currency at whatever market price was least advantageous to the client that 
day. Id. at *3. The results of this maximally-costly-approach—the prices themselves—are disclosed in 
post-trade reports that often come weeks after the transaction and do not list the times at which the 
trade was executed, and that provide little basis by which to determine the implicit profits made by the 
bank. Stationary Engineers Local 39 Pension Trust Fund, 2012 WL 476526, at *2. Therefore, no ex 
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portance, a substantial delay—often about 15 minutes—separates the end of 
the applicable benchmarking period and the revelation of the computed val-
ue.140 Large traders know how their own trades may have influenced the com-
ing price, thereby gaining a structural head start on the market and would-be 
arbitragers,141 one of the many informational advantages that give connected 
banks demonstrably better trading profits than outsiders.142 
Manipulation in currency takes place despite an almost entirely “objec-
tive” benchmark. The benchmark essentially draws only from real transactions, 
and as many as the benchmark provider can observe. The provider exercises 
very little subjectivity or discretion at any stage. The problems in the market 
need not be created by the fibs of data providers or the venality of those close 
to the benchmark. Instead, manipulation can occur as result of the structure of 
the sampling process itself, which counts some trades but excludes other eco-
nomically identical ones. The ability to strategically feed or starve the transac-
tional benchmark of transactional data gives transactors outsized influence.143 
                                                                                                                           
ante discussion of the price may take place and no ex post evaluation may be possible. The result is 
that custodial currency transactions often cost much more than what similar transactions cost other 
retail customers, which is itself still much greater than the wholesale rate. Compare Osler et al., supra 
note 135, at 1700 (stating that the half-spread customer rate was 9.2 basis points, much higher than the 
1.6 basis points for interdealer trades), with Carol Osler et al., Asymmetric Information and the For-
eign Exchange Trades of Global Custody Banks 8 (Nov. 2012) (Brandeis Univ.,Working Paper No. 
55, 2012), available at http://www.brandeis.edu/departments/economics/RePEc/brd/doc/Brandeis_
WP55.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/AMJ7-EAQU (stating that the bid-ask spread on non-OTC 
transaction exceeds 40 basis points). An entire industry of transaction cost-analyses has emerged to 
report on the quality of execution for currency transactions. See, e.g., FXTRANSPARENCY.COM, http://
www.fxtransparency.com/, archived at http://perma.cc/RZ7U-RPSM (last visited Dec. 29, 2014). 
There appears to be a trend in clients pushing for lower costs. Christopher Condon, SEC Investigates 
State Street Over Foreign-Exchange Pricing After Lawsuits, BLOOMBERG NEWS (May 12, 2011), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-05-12/sec-probes-state-street-foreign-exchange-pricing.html, 
archived at https://perma.cc/R2B5-6PZ2?type=image (“Increased scrutiny could force custody banks 
to lower their fees for the service regardless of the legal outcomes . . . .”); FX Transparency Releases 
Study on Standing-Instruction Currency Trading Costs, FXTRANSPARENCY.COM, (Mar. 1, 2011), 
http://www.fxtransparency.com/category/press/, archived at http://perma.cc/L767-4WRF. 
 140 Spot & Forward Rates Guide, supra note 108, at 2. 
 141 Bettina Peirs, Informed Traders, Intervention, and Price Leadership: A Deeper View of the 
Microstructure of the Foreign Exchange Market, 52 J. FIN. 1589, 1612 (1997) (stating that the 
Deutsche Bank is able to anticipate major currency price changes by 60 minutes). 
 142 Lukas Menkhoff et al., Information Flows in Dark Markets: Dissecting Customer Currency 
Trades 30–31 (Bank for Int’l Settlements, Working Paper No. 405, Mar. 2013), available at http://
www.bis.org/publ/work405.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/6QAK-DXQU?type=pdf. 
 143 See supra notes 55–96 and accompanying text; infra notes 203–298 and accompanying text. 
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B. Crude Oil 
The crude oil market is massive (at least five trillion dollars), but the eco-
nomics understates its importance.144 It is one of the few commodities for 
which nations do not hesitate to fight wars, and its pricing at the pump is a re-
gressive and salient cost for low-income Americans. Given its size and im-
portance, one might imagine that it is relatively difficult to engage in tradition-
al price manipulation. 
Yet it is also fundamentally dependent upon a few price benchmarks. 
Crude oil is mostly traded bilaterally, over-the-counter in an opaque market.145 
Price reporting agencies, such as Platts and Argus, have gathered and sold 
transactional data relating to the various grades of crude oil, for delivery to 
various locations, for more than 100 years.146 Their benchmarks have also been 
the instrumentality of pervasive manipulation.147 
1. Hardwiring 
Few markets show as much hardwiring of contracts as crude oil. As with 
all industries, long term and derivative contracts tend to cite a market rate.148 
But even spot-contracts, the sort of contract that we normally think of as un-
likely to use a benchmark, make extensive use of them.149 Several factors drive 
extensive benchmark use. First, because oil must be shipped over vast distanc-
es, even contracts for present delivery necessarily take place in the future. 
Whenever there is timing risk, parties may wish to adjust for market changes. 
Second, many sellers are oil producing countries who do not wish to empha-
size the degree to which they influence oil prices. By incorporating a price 
benchmark, they appear to defer to market forces. Third, historical legacies 
served to establish norms that may remain for all the reasons that widespread 
                                                                                                                           
 144 Global Oil & Gas Exploration & Production: Market Research Report, IBIS WORLD (Feb. 
2014), http://www.ibisworld.com/industry/global/global-oil-gas-exploration-production.html, archived at 
http://perma.cc/2SWF-X2MX. 
 145 Putting a Price on Energy: International Price Mechanisms for Oil & Gas, ENERGY CHARTER 
SECRETARIAT 79–80 (Mar. 1, 2007), http://www.encharter.org/fileadmin/user_upload/document/Oil_
and_Gas_Pricing_2007_ENG.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/XX4E-6H96. 
 146 History, PLATTS, http://www.platts.com/history, archived at https://perma.cc/EVP4-CVQV?
type=source (last visited Dec. 29, 2014) (stating that Warren Platt started his publishing venture in 
1909). 
 147 See infra notes 172–176, 231–243 and accompanying text; see also Ajay Makan et al., supra 
note 7 (describing an investigation by European authorities into illegal price manipulation of industry 
benchmarks by major oil companies). 
 148 Fattouh, supra note 96, at 7 (“Price agreements are usually concluded on the method of formu-
la pricing that links the price of a cargo in long-term contracts to a market (spot) price. Formula pric-
ing has become the basis of the oil pricing system.”); see, e.g., 3A MUNICIPAL LEGAL FORMS § 67:13 
(West ed., 2014) (using Platts index in escalator clause). 
 149 Fattouh, supra note 96, at 24. 
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practices remain. For most of history, the majority of crude oil producers have 
not even attempted to sell (or report selling) at a “market” price. Producer 
prices were often purely notional, serving mostly to allocate tax revenues be-
tween producer country and consumer country.150 It should be little surprise 
that pricing systems developed to work with, or around, such price data may 
not always flawlessly represent the increasingly “real” pricing of oil. 
2. Susceptibility 
Crude oil generally, and certain grades in particular, exhibit ample con-
centration and voluntariness. Only the last thirty minutes of trading actually 
influences the leading benchmark price.151 Trades at lunchtime, no matter how 
momentous, simply do not count. As a result, the Platts’s methodology cap-
tures less than three percent of the total trades.152 This is a concentrated do-
main, and one that is amenable to strategic behavior because these trades are 
only eligible for inclusion. To be actually included, a trader must voluntarily 
report the trade to Platts. 153 
If neither trader reports the trade, it will not be included in the bench-
mark.154 As one expert commentator notes, 
Platts has no power to force any company to reveal all the deals it 
does. Companies can therefore cherry pick which deals to show to in 
the Platts window and which to exclude. There is no sanction 
against showing only one half of a non-arm’s length transaction.155 
Thus, parties have substantial strategic control over the data they bring to 
Platts’ attention and the data that goes unreported.156 Strategic submissions are 
one reason that less than ten percent of the most relevant trades are incorpo-
                                                                                                                           
 150 See Putting a Price on Energy: International Price Mechanisms for Oil & Gas, supra note 
145, at 76–77. 
 151 See INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS ET AL, supra note 96, at 13; European Oil Products: Edito-
rial Guidelines and Methodologies, PLATTS 2–3 (Feb. 2011), http://www.platts.com/IM.Platts.
Content/MethodologyReferences/MethodologySpecs/europeanoilproductspecsguideline.pdf, archived 
at https://perma.cc/3UDR-CJMM?type=pdf. 
 152 Fattouh, supra note 96, at 32 (finding that the volume of spot market trades accounted for in 
the Platts window constituted only 2.3% of the total volume of trades).  
 153 BD. OF THE INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, supra note 68, at 29.  
 154 Whole categories of sellers never report their trades, leaving many buyers the unilateral power 
to report or suppress the data. See Liz Bossley, Motive, Means, and Opportunity, 94 OXFORD ENERGY 
F. J. 1, 8 (Nov. 2013), available at http://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/
OEF-94.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/X6PV-CJSC?type=pdf. 
 155 Id. 
 156 Platts also interviews traders and engages in independent research, which can supplement the 
observed transactional data. However the push for electronic submission and objective methodology 
has reduced the emphasis of this function. 
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rated into the Platts benchmark price, a fact that has led to criticism in some 
quarters.157 Strategic submission, such as reporting only trades above (or be-
low) the prevailing market price, while suppressing other trades, could obvi-
ously bias the benchmark. 
These benchmarks are plagued by ever-increasing concentration and il-
liquidity. Consider Dubai crude oil, which is perhaps the third most important 
grade in the world for benchmarking purposes. Essentially all oil sales to Asia 
are priced from Dubai. But its importance exceeds its robustness. There is very 
little Dubai crude drilled, pumped, or sold on planet Earth any longer.158 At the 
present, half of trading days see literally no trading in Dubai crude in the prin-
cipal venue that informs the benchmark price. The minimum trading volume in 
that venue is just twenty-five thousand barrels.159 At current market prices 
(roughly one hundred dollars per barrel), that means that for less than three 
million dollars, one could be the only trader in Dubai and thereby choose the 
price of oil shipped to Asia for a day.160 Of those trades that do occur, just 
three traders might make up all trading in a given month, demonstrating sub-
stantial participant concentration.161 This remains a surprisingly small, illiquid, 
and concentrated market, given the size of the global crude trade.162 
The possibility for arbitrage to correct distorted pricing is limited in many 
ways.163 The market is opaque and anything but standardized, as bilateral 
trades of different grades face different shipment costs around the world. Oil is 
expensive to store, and it is practically challenging to arrange shipping to take 
                                                                                                                           
 157 Fattouh, supra note 96, at 31–33.  
 158 Id. at 61–69. The most recent estimates suggest that Dubai’s production has fallen to less than 
60,000 barrels per day. Id. at 61. Meanwhile, about 13.1 million barrels per day are exported from the 
Gulf to Asia. Id. 
 159 Bassam Fattouh, The Dubai Benchmark and Its Role in the International Oil Pricing System, 
OXFORD INST. FOR ENERGY STUD., Mar. 2012, at 2, available at http://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/
wp-content/uploads/2012/03/The-Dubai-Benchmark-and-its-Role-in-the-International-Pricing-System.
pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/ZJ2Q-LG25. 
 160 The spot market itself has less than one trade per week, on average. Id. at 3. 
 161 Fattouh, supra note 96, at 28. 
 162 Id. Things are only slightly less concentrated for West Texas Intermediate, the most important 
grade for American producers and consumers. A typical day might see a dozen spot trades, which is 
far more than Dubai, but still worrying, considering that top three sellers make up fifty-one percent of 
sales and thirty-eight percent of the top three buyers. Id. Compare this to the lower concentration in 
Brent, the most important of the three chief benchmarks. Nearly twenty companies pump contributing 
into the system, and none of them accounts for more than a quarter of production. LIZ BOSSLEY, 
BRENT: A USER’S GUIDE TO THE FUTURE OF THE WORLD PRICE MARKER 83 (2007). See generally 
PAUL HORSNELL & ROBERT MABRO, OIL MARKETS AND PRICES: THE BRENT MARKET AND THE 
FORMATION OF WORLD OIL PRICES 75–77 (1993).  
 163 Adrian Binks, Middle East Crude Oil Pricing: The Dubai Debate, 48 MIDDLE E. ECON. SURV. 
27, 30 (2005). 
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delivery.164 It is a daunting task for an observant speculator to correct biased 
benchmark prices.165 
Many of these vulnerabilities, and the continued use of the benchmark 
notwithstanding them, reflect unaddressed historical legacies. Dubai crude was 
once a plentiful asset,166 meaning that trust was better justified. Oil prices were 
once generated primarily for taxation purposes, not commercial ones, meaning 
that trust was once less expected. And widespread public hardwiring creates 
strong network effects for market participants to remain with the same bench-
marks. It is not unprecedented for these changes to go unaddressed for some 
time: the benchmark for one grade of oil, Alaska North Slope (“ANS”), traded 
for years after the wells effectively went dry,167—an example of essentially 
hypothetical trading.168 
Price reporting agencies are conscious of the risk that changing circum-
stances will render their reports vulnerable or, worse yet, obsolete. They there-
fore update their key benchmarks from time to time, altering their methodolo-
gy to decrease concentration and increase robustness.169 Even when things 
change, though, they may not change in ways that are better in all respects. 
Platts’s current window structure, which privileges certain trades made during 
a thirty-minute period, and which many believe facilitates manipulation, was 
only introduced in 2002, well after Platts’s benchmarks achieved their nested 
dominance.170 This new Platts system renders the price reporting system more 
transparent and objective than under the previous reporting system, which rest-
ed to a greater degree on editors’ subjective judgments. In so doing, however, 
the new system prioritizes the influence of the traders best positioned to ex-
ploit it. 
Given all these markers of benchmark vulnerability, it may be no surprise 
that governments171 and class action plaintiffs allege manipulation in the crude 
oil market.172 This would not be the first time that price reporting agencies 
                                                                                                                           
 164 See PLATTS, supra note 146, at 4 (“Terms of trade such as quality, delivery port, timing of 
delivery/loading and price are fully up to the company issuing the bid or offer.”). 
 165 See Fattouh, supra note 96, at 12. 
 166 Binks, supra note 163, at 27–28. There have been efforts to improve the liquidity of Dubai 
crude, by grouping it with grades that might have otherwise traded separately. Id. at 28–29. 
 167 See, e.g., BP Oil Supply Co. v. United States, 36 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 314, 314 (Ct. Int’l Trade 
2014) (discussing issues arising out of the exportation of ANS); Tesoro Alaska Co. v. Union Oil Co., 
305 P.3d 329, 330–31 (Alaska 2013) (using the ANS benchmark in contract setting). 
 168 See Fattouh, supra note 96, at 70. 
 169 Rauterberg & Verstein, supra note 56, at 122 (describing update to Brent index). 
 170 Peter Stewart, Hard Truths About Market Transparency, 94 OXFORD ENERGY F.J. 4, 5–6 
(2013), http://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/OEF-94.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/3RAH-DXS2. 
 171 Justin Sheck & Jenny Gross, supra note 6. 
 172 E.g., In re Crude Oil Commodity Futures Litig., 913 F. Supp. 2d 41, 49–50 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
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played a role—witting or unwitting—in distorting real prices in the crude oil 
market. In 1940, in United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., the U.S. Supreme 
Court delivered a landmark decision.173 The case, which established the anti-
trust principle of per se illegality, involved serious allegations that Platts and 
its peers “were the instrumentalities by which the artificial spot market prices 
were converted into wholesale prices.”174 In a word, they were hardwired into 
contracts in those days too.175 
C. Equities 
Are equity markets—trading in the shares of stock of major corpora-
tions—vulnerable to the same sort of benchmark manipulation? The answer 
will depend on just what is considered a “benchmark.”176 By any account, eq-
uities are generally less susceptible to benchmark manipulation than other 
markets and their benchmarks, but they are far more susceptible than common-
ly expected. This Section shows that equity markets utilize, and hardwire, 
benchmarks far more widely than is commonly known and that a majority of 
equity market manipulations may be benchmark manipulations. 
One type of benchmark in the equities market is a broad stock index, such 
as the S&P 500. Stock indices arguably seek to represent two different under-
lying markets. First, they seek to capture some broad segment of market activi-
ty. For the S&P 500, that might be the value of America’s large companies. By 
focusing on just 500 firms, the index allows inferences about the rest. 
Second, the S&P 500 also seeks to represent the prices of those very 500 
companies on the list. It is proper to say “represents” because the index is not 
self-executing or fully transparent to the market for those 500 stocks. The S&P 
indices committee designs a methodology for constructing an index value from 
                                                                                                                           
 173 310 U.S. 150, 165–66 (1940). 
 174 Brief for the Petitioners at 141, Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (Nos. 346, 347) 1940 
WL 47028, at *141. 
 175 Id. at 5–6 (stating that major market participants, that sold eighty-five percent of the gasoline 
in the region, used contracts with a hardwired benchmark price). 
 176 Equity indices are commonly distinguished from benchmarks of various sorts. See, e.g., Bar-
bara Novick et al., Best Practices for Better Benchmarks: Recommendations for Financial Benchmark 
Reform, BLACKROCK, Mar. 2013, at 2, available at https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/en-us/
literature/whitepaper/recommendations-for-financial-benchmark-reform.pdf, archived at https://
perma.cc/RNA4-LFQB?type=pdf. This Article has deliberately avoided defining or distinguishing 
benchmarks and indices, using them interchangeably, because of the variety of different convention 
associated with them. Sometimes the distinction reflects assets: it is common to refer to commodity 
benchmarks and equity indices. Sometimes, terminology denotes the degree of hardwiring: bench-
marks are hardwired, indices are not. Given the various senses in common usage, that it makes little 
sense to privilege one in a paper designed to illuminate each phenomenon. In any case, as this section 
demonstrates, differences in economic substance between equity indices and other benchmarks are of 
degree rather than of kind. 
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a subset of available and ambiguous data. For example, declines of a compa-
ny’s stock price should generally lower the S&P, but not if the decline is due 
to a stock split or some other nominal activity. Likewise, increasing the num-
ber of shares of a company—if the per-share price remains constant—should 
represent an increase in the company’s value to the index. But, such is not the 
case if the increase is lodged solely in the company’s treasury or in a control 
group. S&P must craft and apply policies to ambiguous acts.177 
Just like any benchmark, the S&P 500 represents a non-obvious set of da-
ta, which is combined in a non-obvious fashion, to compute an index value. 
And, in the end, it is the “official” S&P calculation of the index value, and not 
the value computed by stock exchanges, funds or anyone else, that acts as the 
settlement price of financial derivatives.178 
If the S&P 500 can be a benchmark of those 500 stocks, could an “S&P 
1” exist that would represent—authoritatively, for contracts that hardwired a 
reference—the price of a single stock? Indeed. Such narrow benchmarks are 
terrifically important, and are the locus of substantial equity market manipula-
tion. 
The most important narrow benchmark is the end of day or closing price 
on a stock exchange. It may seem that the closing price is a brute fact—simply 
whatever price the stock most recently traded for—but that is not quite right. 
Closing prices are conjured subject to elaborate rules (often designed to reduce 
manipulative potential), and often differ considerably from the calculation of 
price throughout the day. In some cases, closing prices are calculated by ag-
gregating the trading prices for some number of minutes leading up to the end 
of the day.179 Others contrive auctions intended to maximize the amount of 
tradable stock.180 Other markets select a random moment in time prior to clos-
ing to represent the closing price.181 In each case, manipulation is a temptation 
                                                                                                                           
 177 S&P must also monitor for changes. It is possible that S&P will exclude changes pending 
verification of data for a longer or shorter period than market participants themselves would, thereby 
excluding some transactions from the calculation. S&P Dow Jones Indices Corporate Actions: Poli-
cies & Practices, S&P DOW JONES 31–32 (Jul. 2012), https://www.djindexes.com/mdsidx/downloads/
client_services/methodology-sp-corporate-actions-policies-practices.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/
Z2S5-HCPR. 
 178 Mini-SPX Index Options—XSP: Contract Specifications for XSP, CBOE, https://www.cboe.
com/micro/xsp/specifications.aspx, archived at https://perma.cc/25SQ-X3HN (last visited Dec. 29, 
2014) (“The exercise settlement value, XSP, is one-tenth (1/10th) the official closing price of the S&P 
500 Index as reported by Standard & Poor’s on the last trading day of the expiring series.”). 
 179 The Hong Kong Stock Exchange averages the median price, gathered every fifteen seconds 
leading up to close. Closing Price Calculation, H.K. STOCK EXCH., http://www.hkex.com.hk/eng/
market/sec_tradinfo/Documents/closepricecal.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/V63J-K3TF (last up-
dated Mar. 23, 2009). 
 180 See Closing Auctions, N.Y. STOCK EXCH. (2014), http://www.nyse.com/equities/nysearc
aequities/1157623605155.html, archived at http://perma.cc/JSQ7-NZD6. 
 181 LARRY HARRIS, TRADING AND EXCHANGES 136 (2003). 
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because traders need only trade or make offers of a certain type, at a certain 
time, in order to influence the publicly recognized proxy for price.182 
All exchanges reserve for themselves the ability to undo or modify clos-
ing prices under suspicious circumstances, making the persistence of the clos-
ing price a product of the exchange’s discretion.183 To be sure, exchanges only 
rarely edit prices for having been erroneous or fraudulent. But they may do so 
in some of the most dramatic moments, underscoring the difference between 
the “official” price and actual transactional prices in order to achieve justice 
and restore credibility. There is a lesson to be learned from the infamous “flash 
crash” of 2010, in which the Dow Jones Industrial Average lost almost ten 
percent of its value in minutes, and then fully recovered a few minutes later.184 
The New York Stock Exchange subsequently cancelled all trades on some se-
curities—and no trades for others—amending the official history of prices to 
exclude transactions made in that window.185 
Unlike exchange closing prices, which do not incorporate trades executed 
off of the exchange, other venues may sometimes trade at meaningfully differ-
ent prices because exchanges adopt rules for categorically excluding certain 
kinds of trades. For example, New York Stock Exchange rules prevent the ex-
ecution of a short sale far below the otherwise prevailing price.186 If a large 
short sale took place over-the-counter near the end of the day, the closing price 
of the NYSE price of the stock would appear to be much higher than the most 
recent genuine transaction. There is nothing wrong with excluding off-
exchange data, nor having rules about what sorts of trades are acceptable on 
the exchange. Each of these rules may be intended to improve the quality of 
the closing price. Yet each one is an editorial choice. Rules and interventions 
non-trivially modify the representation to make it non-self-executing, depend-
ent upon the exchange qua benchmark provider, and subject to this Article’s 
benchmark analysis. 
Stock indices and closing prices are extremely important to the market. 
They are hardwired into all kinds of legal relationships, which leads to the 
                                                                                                                           
 182 Jonathan Guthrie, Compliance Training Cannot Save Forex from Red Tape, FIN. TIMES, July 4, 
2014, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/5f4d5c46-02a0-11e4-a68d-00144feab7de.html#axzz3JutCaz5G, 
archived at https://perma.cc/55TX-EHBJ?type=pdf (discussing manipulation of closing prices as “an 
open secret”). 
 183 NYSE Rule 128, N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) ¶ 2128 (2008).  
 184 Tom Lauricella, Market Plunge Baffles Wall Street: Trading Glitch Suspected in ‘Mayhem’ as 
Dow Falls Nearly 1,000, Then Bounces, WALL ST. J., May 7, 2010, at A1. 
 185 Final Update: CEE Review Determination for Multiple Symbols, N.Y. STOCK EXCH. (Aug. 1, 
2012), http://markets.nyx.com/nyse/trader-updates/view/11183, archived at http://perma.cc/N73M-
52FE. 
 186 NYSE Rule 440B, N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) ¶ 2440B (2008).  
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temptation to manipulate.187 The S&P 500 is the settlement value for some of 
the world’s most traded financial derivatives,188 as well as the blueprint for 
perhaps one trillion dollars worth of investment funds.189 Hundreds of thou-
sands of other equity indices serve similar purposes elsewhere.190 
Closing prices are a common settlement value for financial derivatives 
based on single equities, such as stock options.191 Mutual funds are legally 
obliged to pay investors their pro rata share of the Net Asset Value of the fund; 
that is an owner of one percent of the fund should get one percent of its value 
when she sells. Funds calculate Net Asset Value using the closing prices of 
their assets.192 Even other markets rely on one another’s closing prices.193 
Margin requirements for traders are computed based upon the closing 
price of stocks they hold—if closing prices go down, they could face a margin 
call. The requirement to put more cash in the exchange or clearinghouse could 
be merely troublesomeness or a prelude to bankruptcy. Consider again the 
“flash crash,” in which stock prices astoundingly plummeted for just a few 
minutes. Because the flash crash was midday, it was an alarming inconven-
ience. Had it been the last few minutes of trading, closing prices would have 
reflected the glitch.194 That catastrophe could have bankrupted a number of 
“too-big-to-fail” banks.195 
Basket equity indices, like the S&P 500, seem to be rather robust against 
influence. The data on which they draw is non-voluntary, and the pool they 
observe is a very large slice of the relevant market. Major equity indices are 
updated frequently. Regulation and public disclosure surrounding their subject 
matter makes arbitrage relatively easy. And many have struck appropriate bal-
                                                                                                                           
 187 See Carhart et al., supra note 51, at 665–67; Gallagher et al., supra note 51, at 16–17 (explain-
ing that fund manager performance predicts manipulation). 
 188 Rauterberg & Verstein, supra note 56, at 111–12.  
 189 John Davies, Using ETF’s for Strategic Portfolio Construction, S&P INDICES, http://us.
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portfolio-construction.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/7MWX-PJ4Y (last visited Dec. 30, 2014). 
 190 See Rauterberg & Verstein, supra note 56, at 106–08. 
 191 Equity vs. Index Options, OPTIONS INDUS. COUNCIL, http://www.optionseducation.org/
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Dec. 27, 2014). 
 192 Frequently Asked Questions About Mutual Fund Price Sharing, INV. CO. INST. (Oct. 2002), 
http://www.ici.org/faqs/faq/faqs_navs, archived at http://perma.cc/4P5X-KANP. 
 193 See HARRIS, supra note 181, at 32 (describing crossing networks). 
 194 See Ananth Madhaven, Exchange-Traded Funds, Market Structure and the Flash Crash, 68 
FIN. ANALYSTS J., July/Aug. 2012, at 20, available at http://www.cfapubs.org/doi/pdf/10.2469/faj.
v68.n4.6, archived at https://perma.cc/8ENE-BL8S?type=image. 
 195 Large banks operate with relatively low levels of equity. A sudden decline of ten percent or 
more in asset value would eliminate all the equity value of all but a well-capitalized institution. 
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ances between transparency and operational discretion. It is challenging to im-
agine manipulation without the collusive help of the benchmark provider, un-
derscoring the importance of conflicts of interest in the benchmark business.196 
Closing prices are slightly more worrisome. Their high degree of hardwir-
ing makes them attractive targets for manipulation. Markets demand a high 
degree of mechanization and transparency in their calculation, which makes it 
comparatively easy for manipulators to construct a strategy likely to influence 
the price during the relevant period.197 “Banging the close,” which is the name 
for aggressive attacks on the closing price of a stock, is properly understood as 
a species of benchmark manipulation. For example, in 1999, a trader bought 
two hundred thousand shares of a Mexican television station in the final 
minutes of the trading day.198 These orders represented ninety-four percent of 
all trading of the stock in the last hour of the day.199 His objective was to es-
cape from his obligations under a financial derivative contract, which required 
him to buy eight hundred sixty thousand shares unless the stock closed at 
greater than five dollars per share.200 The price increased by fifteen cents per 
share, barely crossing the five dollar threshold.201 
This sort of market manipulation is common.202 Indeed, it is hard to find 
an example of stock price manipulation that does not target the closing (or 
opening) price. Recognition that closing prices share characteristics in com-
mon with crude oil and foreign currency benchmarks is an important starting 
point for finding comprehensive solutions to the problem of benchmark ma-
nipulation. 
IV. PROTECTING AGAINST BENCHMARK MANIPULATION 
Governments around the world are grappling with widespread market 
manipulation. The United States has followed the traditional common law ap-
proach to novel wrongdoing: preserve substantial freedom, but create private 
or public causes of action to hold bad actors accountable for their misdeeds. 
By contrast, Europe is poised for a typical civilian response: extensively regu-
                                                                                                                           
 196 See infra notes 294–295 and accompanying text. Also, fund managers appear disposed to 
make uneconomic trades, wasting their client’s money, in order to bolster apparent returns at salient 
measurement periods. Gallagher et al., supra note 51. 
 197 See, e.g., SEC v. Masri, 523 F. Supp. 2d 361, 363–65 (S.D.N.Y 2007) (describing when de-
fendant, motivated by a stock option he had sold, bought aggressively during last ten minutes of trad-
ing day). 
 198 Id. at 362–65. 
 199 Id. at 364–65. 
 200 Id. at 366. 
 201 Id. at 375. Of course, we cannot conclude from this alone that the purchases were able to cause 
a price change. 
 202 See Comerton-Forde & Putniņš, supra note 51, at 2–5.  
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late the troubled sector, eliminating the flexibility that might be used in 
wrongdoing. 
This Part criticizes both the American ex post approach and the European 
ex ante approach, showing that neither evinces a good understanding of the 
role benchmarks play in market manipulation. First, Section A examines the 
American approach. The American approach fixates on fraud. But benchmark 
manipulation need not satisfy the key elements of a fraud action. Fraud re-
quires a misstatement which is believed, but benchmark manipulation works 
even if traders are always truthful, or (conversely) even if their victims know 
that they are being lied to. After criticizing the current fraud-based approach, 
this Article argues for an alternative that emphasizes benchmark manipulation 
as a distinctive legal harm worthy of remedy. 
Second, Section B examines the Europeans approach. The European ap-
proach imposes top-down constraints on the production and use of bench-
marks, but its mandates are often quite unwise. Misunderstanding the opera-
tion of important benchmarks, the European Commission approach would tend 
to exacerbate the risk of benchmark abuse, while greatly curtailing innovation 
in the sector. In response, this Article proposes more modest legislative re-
sponses 
A. Market Abuse Litigation: The “American” Approach 
Using litigation to discourage benchmark manipulation is crucial to re-
ducing it, but our current course is inadequate. Subsection 1 shows that Con-
gress, agencies, and courts have all pushed our law to focus singularly on 
fraud. It also argues that, while fraud is important, anti-fraud law is not a good 
fit for benchmark manipulation. Subsection 2 explains why and how non-
fraudulent benchmark manipulation should be considered a distinct offense 
under market abuse law. 
1. Manipulation Through Fraud 
Manipulative conduct could run afoul many bodies of law. If manipula-
tors cooperate to execute their scheme, they might violate antitrust laws.203 
They might have breached explicit or implied duties to contractual counterpar-
                                                                                                                           
 203 See http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/01/05/us-jpmorgan-forex-jpmorgan-idUSKBN0KE
1A420150105, archived at http://perma.cc/H6UT-4NJK (settlement in FX action). Contra In re LI-
BOR-Based Fin. Instruments Antitrust Litig., 935 F. Supp. 2d 666, 688–89 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (dismiss-
ing anti-trust claims in rate manipulation case where where activity was never purported to be compet-
itive), reconsideration denied, 962 F. Supp. 2d 606 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), appeal dismissed, No. 13-3565-
L, 2013 WL 9557843 (2d Cir. Oct. 30, 2013), cert. granted sub nom. Gelboim v. Bank of Am. Corp., 
134 S. Ct. 2876 (2014), reconsideration denied, No. 11 MD 2262 NRB, 2014 WL 2815645 (S.D.N.Y. 
June 23, 2014).  
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ties with whom they are in privity.204 They might even be liable in restitution 
for ill-gotten gains.205 Yet there will be times where manipulation was not col-
lusive, and where contractual and restitutionary plaintiffs are difficult to identi-
fy and organize. It is largely for such cases that our market abuse laws, such as 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Commodities Exchange Act, 
make a vital contribution by specifically prohibiting manipulation. Yet even 
these anti-manipulation probation statutes have not been operationalized in a 
manner that adequately discourages benchmark manipulation.  
 Although section 9 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 prohibits in-
tentional manipulation of securities through trading, the SEC has instead gen-
erally preferred to duck the difficult intent requirement of this statute by in-
stead using Rule 10b-5.206 Rule 10b-5 is entitled “Employment of Manipula-
tive and Deceptive Practices.” Despite mentioning manipulation in its title, the 
rule makes no subsequent reference to manipulation as distinct from fraud, and 
U.S. Supreme Court decisions have “deprived the word manipulative of any 
independent significance.”207 
When courts consider cases lacking a discernable element of fraud, they 
are generally quite skeptical.208 Courts bend over backwards to exonerate de-
fendants in so-called “open market” cases. These are cases in which each com-
ponent part is a legal transaction and in which there is no fraud of any kind—
the transaction is “out in the open.” Courts have been split about whether such 
cases can ever constitute manipulation.209 The most recent court to address 
                                                                                                                           
 204 Cf. note 139 and accompanying text. It would seem that manipulating a benchmark would 
violate the duty of good faith.  
 205 Ariel Portat & Eric Posner, Offsetting Benefits, 100 VA. L. REV. 1165, 1194–95, 1200 (2014). 
 206 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 9, 15 U.S.C. § 78i (2012); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2014). 
 207 Steve Thel, Regulation of Manipulation Under Section 10(b), 1988 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 359, 
384–85; see, e.g., Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 472 U.S. 1, 12 (1985) (holding that “manip-
ulative” in the context of securities litigation requires misrepresentation or nondisclosure); Santa Fe 
Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476 (1977) (“[Manipulation] generally refers to practices, such as 
wash sales, matched orders, or rigged prices, that are intended to mislead investors by artificially 
affecting market activity.”); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 (1976) (defining manipu-
lation as a species of “conduct designed to deceive or defraud investors”). 
 208 Foss v. Bear Stearns & Co. Inc., 394 F.3d 540, 542 (7th Cir. 2005) (“[M]anipulation is a kind 
of fraud; deceit remains essential.”); Gurary v. Nu-Tech, 190 F.3d 37, 45 (2d. Cir. 1999) (stating that 
the “gravamen of manipulation is deception of investors” and ruling for defendant when fraud could 
not be established); In re Olympia Brewing Co. Sec. Litig., 613 F. Supp. 1286, 1292 (N.D. Ill. 1985) 
(“Regardless of whether market manipulation is achieved through deceptive trading activities or de-
ceptive statements as to the issuing corporation’s value, it is clear that the essential element of the 
claim is that inaccurate information is being injected into the marketplace.”). 
 209 See United States v. Regan, 937 F.2d 823, 829 (2d Cir. 1991) (leaving unclear whether liabil-
ity rested on intent alone, or intent plus deceptive practice); In re College Bound Consol. Litig., No. 
93 Civ. 2348, 1995 WL 450486, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. July 31, 1995) (declining to rule on sufficiency of 
intent for manipulation); see also Nanopierce Techs., Inc. v. Southridge Capital Mgmt, No. 02 Civ. 
0767, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24049, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 2002) (“The law of the Second Circuit 
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these matters held that non-fraudsters commit manipulation only if “the SEC 
[can] prove that but for the manipulative intent the defendant would not have 
conducted the transaction.”210 That is, otherwise lawful trading remains lawful 
if done for manipulative purposes, so long as the trader also had independently 
sufficient reason to trade.211 This is a tough standard that effectively requires 
the SEC to focus instead on cases involving fraud. 
Courts’ focus on fraud is in keeping with the spirit in which 10b-5 was 
adopted.212 It is also arguably in keeping with the structure of the Securities 
Exchange Act, which does not have a general prohibition on market manipula-
tion.213 By contrast, the Commodity Exchange Act provides general anti-
manipulation provisions, quite apart from fraud.214 Yet the CFTC has struggled 
in vain to bring anti-manipulation claims.215 It has lost all but one such case—a 
recent “bang the close” case.216 One recent case may give a sense of insupera-
ble barriers to winning without showing fraud. Four traders were charged with 
manipulating the propane market by making bids and offers (and subsequent 
                                                                                                                           
on so-called open-market manipulation—where the alleged manipulator has made otherwise legiti-
mate trades, yet with the subjective intent to affect the stock price thereby—is not yet fully settled.”). 
Compare GFL Advantage Fund, Ltd., v. Colkitt, 272 F.3d 189, 205 (3d Cir. 2001) (stating that ma-
nipulative intent alone is not sufficient), with Markowski v. SEC, 274 F.3d 525, 528–29 (D.C. Cir. 
2001) (stating that manipulative intent alone is sufficient).  
 210 SEC v. Masri, 523 F. Supp. 2d 361, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); accord ATSI Commc’n, Inc. v. 
Shaar Fund, Ltd. 493 F.3d 87, 100 (2d Cir. 2007) (requiring a showing of deception with respect to 
how other market participants valued the security); see United States v. Mulheren, 938 F.2d 364, 369 
(2d Cir. 1991) (using, without adopting, an even more stringent “solely” for manipulative purposes 
standard). 
 211 The Masri court approvingly cites scholars Daniel Fischel and David Ross in their discussion 
about intent. See 523 F. Supp. 2d at 372 (citing Fischel & Ross, supra note 12, at 512).  
 212 Rule 10b-5 was quickly drafted and approved and the only discussion reported was Commis-
sioner Pike’s offhand remark, “Well, we are against fraud, aren’t we?” Milton V. Freeman, Colloqui-
um Foreword, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. S1, S1–S2 (1993). 
 213 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 9, 15 U.S.C. § 78i (2012) (prohibiting manipulation for 
the purpose of inducing purchase or sale of a security, or creating the false or misleading appearance 
of market activity); see also Securities Act of 1933 § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77q (2012) (prohibiting 
fraud); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2012) (making unlawful “any ma-
nipulative or deceptive device” in connection with the purchase or sale of a security, in contravention 
of an SEC rule). This is the starting place for Rule 10b-5 and its anti-fraud jurisprudence. 
 214 See Commodity Exchange Act §§ 6, 9, 7 U.S.C. §§ 9, 13 (2012); Energy Policy Act of 2005 
§§ 315, 1283, 15 U.S.C. § 717c, 16 U.S.C. § 824 (2005); Cox, [1986–1987 Transfer Binder] 786 
Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 23,786 (July 15, 1987). 
 215 Craig Pirrong, Commodity Market Manipulation Law: A (Very) Critical Analysis and a Pro-
posed Alternative, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 958, 959 (1994) (“[C]urrent precedents make it extreme-
ly difficult to find a trader guilty of manipulation even in cases in which the economic analysis sug-
gests that the trader has indeed manipulated.”). 
 216 JERRY MARKHAM. LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE HISTORY OF FINANCIAL MARKET MANIPU-
LATION 288 (2014). 
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purchases and sales) intended primarily to influence the market price.217 The 
district court dismissed the charges as a matter of law: “Acting in a manner 
that shifts the price of a commodity in a favorable direction is the business of 
profit-making enterprises, and if it is done without fraud or misrepresentation, 
it does not clearly violate the CEA.”218 
After decades of the CFTC attempting to win manipulation cases without 
alleging fraud,219 Congress has seemingly ratified the judicial focus on fraud, 
by including in Dodd-Frank statutory language granting the CFTC fraud-based 
manipulative enforcement authority.220 The CFTC has adopted an anti-fraud 
rule that tracks the language of SEC Rule 10b-5 and explicitly incorporates 
most SEC anti-fraud doctrine.221 
This triumph of securities-style anti-fraud has been replicated in the re-
maining two market abuse statutes,222 such that the twenty-first century has 
seen a complete administrative and legislative endorsement of the fraud theory 
of manipulation. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), the 
regulator charged with maintaining our natural gas and electricity markets, has 
also adopted a rule tracking 10b-5.223 As if that were not enough to make the 
point, FERC then rescinded an existing rule that appeared to target non-
fraudulent manipulation, concluding that, “[M]arket power is a structural issue 
to be remedied, not by behavioral prohibitions . . . .”224 Market participants 
appear free to conduct themselves manipulatively, so long as they do so truth-
fully. 
                                                                                                                           
 217 United States v. Radley, 659 F. Supp. 2d 803, 805–09 (S.D. Tex. 2009), aff’d 632 F.3d 177 
(5th Cir. 2011). 
 218 Id. at 816.  
 219 On the challenges the CFTC faced in pursuing manipulation claims without fraud, see Rosa 
Abrantes-Metz, Gabriel Rauterberg, & Andrew Verstein, Revolution in Manipulation Law: The New 
CFTC Rules and the Urgent Need for Economic and Empirical Analyses, 15 U. PENN. J. BUS. L. 357, 
369–78 (2013). 
 220 Dodd-Frank Act § 753, Pub. L. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1750 (amending Commodity Exchange 
Act, § 6(c), 7 U.S.C. § 9 (2012)). 
 221 Compare 17 C.F.R. § 180.1 (2012) (granting CFTC fraud-based manipulative authority), with 
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2014) (granting SEC fraud-based manipulative authority). 
 222 Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C § 717c-1 (2012) (prohibiting manipulative practices, as described 
in the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012)); Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 824v 
(2012) (prohibiting manipulative practices, as described in the § 78j(b)); Prohibition of Energy Market 
Manipulation, 71 Fed. Reg. 4244, 4244–58 (Jan. 26, 2006) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 1c) (provid-
ing anti-manipulation rules under Federal Power Act and Natural Gas Act). 
 223 Prohibition of Energy Market Manipulation, 71 Fed. Reg. at 4244–58.  
 224 Order Revising Market-Based Rate Tariffs and Authorizations, 114 FERC ¶ 61,165, at 10 
(Feb. 16, 2006), available at http://www.ferc.gov/enforcement/enforce-res/invest-MBR-02-16-2006.
pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/DUA3-PQSQ?type=pdf; see David Spence & Robert Prentice, The 
Transformation of American Energy Markets and the Problem of Market Power, 53 B.C. L. REV. 131, 
162 (2012) (“FERC specifically rejected the notion that Rule 2 had been aimed at curbing . . . conduct 
not involving deception and fraud . . . .”). 
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The recent focus on fraud is understandable for both practical and princi-
pled reasons. First, there is no doubt that fraudulent manipulation is possible: 
fraud clearly meets the theoretical burden set out by manipulation skeptics in 
Part I. Though it is costly to affect prices by gigantic purchases, it is cheap to 
do it with a lie, and easy enough that even a high school student can do it.225 
Second, regulators have seen greater successes under 10b-5-type manipulation 
authority than through causes of action unconnected to fraud. Third, fraudulent 
manipulation works by spreading misinformation, which is a considerable evil 
given the importance of informational efficiency to capital markets.226 Insofar 
as a fraud is a distinctive harm, manipulation cases can instrumentally serve to 
pursue an independently bad act. Fourth, some part of the law’s reluctance to 
pursue manipulation in the absence of fraud is no doubt a concern about false 
positive.227 Trade-based manipulation often resembles legitimate trading tech-
niques by informed traders that are socially beneficial.228 Courts would be 
loath to mistakenly punish an ordinary or informed speculator. Focusing on 
fraud extricates us from this problem. Fraud looks sufficiently different from 
all socially valuable behaviors that we are not worried about convicting the 
innocent. 
Although it is understandable why officials might favor a fraud-focused 
view of manipulation, these trends do not bode well for law enforcement. This 
is because benchmark manipulation is an unlikely candidate for anti-fraud 
laws. Although benchmarks make a fine platform for fraud,229 their distinctive 
benefit is magnifying the manipulative power of real trades and information. 
The elements of common law fraud include misrepresentation and reliance.230 
Both of these elements may be absent from benchmark manipulation. 
                                                                                                                           
 225 MICHAEL LEWIS, NEXT: THE FUTURE JUST HAPPENED 27–28 (2001) (describing how a high 
school student made almost a million dollars by planting optimistic rumors on Yahoo Finance mes-
sage boards). 
 226 Zohar Goshen, The Essential Role of Securities Regulation, 55 DUKE L.J. 711, 713 (2006). 
 227 See Fischel & Ross, supra note 12, at 519–23. 
 228 See id. at 519–22 (arguing that certain trading strategies, often associated manipulative 
schemes, have legitimate justifications); Kyle & Viswanathan, supra note 19, at 274 (arguing that 
trading should only be prohibited if it harms both liquidity and price discovery, and much manipula-
tion does not); Jiang et al., supra note 23, at 148–50 (arguing that some prominent examples of trade-
based manipulation were really just informed trading).  
 229 See U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Johnson, 408 F. Supp. 2d 259, 263–65 (S.D. 
Tex. 2005). 
 230 See, e.g., Strategic Diversity, Inc. v. Alchemix Corp., 666 F.3d. 1197, 1210 n.3 (9th Cir. 
2012). Note that reliance is an element of private civil securities actions, but not where the SEC or 
DOJ is the plaintiff. DONNA M. NAGY, RICHARD W. PAINTER, MARGARET V. SACHS, SECURITIES 
LITIGATION AND ENFORCEMENT 149 (2011). 
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a. Misrepresentation 
First, consider misrepresentation. Benchmark manipulation can occur by 
way of selective disclosure or strategic trading. Selective disclosure involves 
releasing to the benchmark provider only data relating to some of one’s market 
conduct, such as trades, while strategic trading may involve adopting some 
consistent policy for sharing data (for, example, report nothing) but guiding 
market conduct in such a way that the net result will bias the benchmark. The 
former is unlikely to qualify as misrepresentation, while the latter assuredly 
does not. 
Selectively reporting trades—for example, reporting only one’s aggres-
sive sales, but never one’s purchases—involves literally true statements, so 
such conduct can constitute a misrepresentation only if the trader is under a 
duty to disclose the omitted trade information.231 Such a duty is implausible in 
many cases of benchmark manipulation. In many markets, the norm is to pro-
vide about ten percent of transactional data and it is well known that parties 
allow business considerations to influence the selection.232 It seems unlikely 
that any listener has a reasonable expectation that others will report in a forth-
right and representative fashion. 
The absence of fraud is even clearer where the manipulator never affirma-
tively reports anything. Instead of imagining a trader who reports every sell 
and omits every buy, we could imagine a trader who reports nothing, but tried 
to sell to parties known to report their trades and buy only from counterparties 
who tend not to report.233 A selective trading strategy would support a record 
of ample selling that could bias the benchmark price downward to the same 
degree as selective reporting. 
Selective trading can achieve a similar effect, as exemplified in the for-
eign exchange market. In that market, only trading on a certain electronic sys-
tem figures into the benchmark. A trader could make her large sales through 
                                                                                                                           
 231 See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 239 n.17 (1988) (“To be actionable . . . a statement 
must . . . be misleading. Silence, absent a duty to disclose, is not misleading under [the federal securi-
ties laws].”); Merrill Lynch & Co. Inc. v. Allegheny Energy, Inc., 500 F.3d 171, 181 (2d Cir. 2007) 
(“Where a defendant, as here, seeks to show fraud by omission, it must prove additionally that the 
plaintiff had a duty to disclose the concealed fact.”); In re Time Warner Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 
267 (2d Cir. 1993) (“[A]n omission is actionable under the securities laws only when the [defendant] 
is subject to a duty to disclose the omitted facts.”). 
 232 See supra notes 176–202 and accompanying text; see also BD. OF THE INT’L ORG. OF SEC. 
COMM’NS, supra note 68, at 29 (stating that data providers are under no obligation to submit data). 
Some have suggested that Regulation FD and relevant provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley might limit stra-
tegic disclosure, but that is not a natural inference from either document. Fattouh, supra note 96, at 33 
n.44.  
 233 An increasingly portion of the market may be reluctant to submit data at all, fearing liability. 
Stewart, supra note 170, at 6.  
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the Reuters system, and make her large purchases by telephone or through an-
other electronic system.234 While timing trades to impact the benchmark, or 
generating uneconomic trades,235 might sometimes be considered fraudulent, 
these traders might make real trades with an economic basis at their natural 
time. In a world in which trillions of dollars are transacted both on and off the 
electronic system, and where many reasons motivate the venue choice, it is 
implausible that the choice of trade location can be regarded as a material 
omission or a material misstatement. But the choice of venue is a choice as to 
whether or not to impact the benchmark. 
Consider one final example of how real trades, conducted in the open, 
have been used to manipulate a benchmark without making any statement. In 
the famous 1940 U.S. Supreme Court case, United States v. Socony-Vacuum 
Oil Co., the government’s complaint originally argued that the leading bench-
marks, including Platts, were complicit in a plot by oil companies to control 
the price of oil.236 The prosecution even called the benchmarks’ complicity, 
“the nub of the Government’s case.”237 
The oil companies, it was argued, bought up all the oil sold by third-party 
refiners in order to feed into benchmarks some very high market prices.238 That 
would assure them very high revenue from their many long-term sale contracts 
drawing on the benchmark.239 Against this, the oil companies presented evi-
dence that (1) the oil companies bought at very low prices in the open market, 
such that their reporting would have lowered the benchmark;240 and (2) in any 
case, the benchmarks categorically excluded purchases by major oil companies 
                                                                                                                           
 234 BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, supra note 126, at 9 (“They can evade detection . . . by exe-
cuting large flows in less transparent venues, including reverting to transacting bilaterally over the 
telephone.”). 
 235 Order Assessing Civil Penalties, 144 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,041, at 21, 40 (July 16, 2013), available at 
http://www.ferc.gov/eventcalendar/Files/20130716170107-IN08-8-000.pdf, archived at https://perma.
cc/K888-FMGF?type=pdf. 
 236 Transcript of Record at 24, United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. (Socony-Vacuum Oil, 
Co. I), 310 U.S. 150 (1940) (Nos. 346, 347) (citing the indictment). The benchmark providers were 
supposedly tolerant to this practice. Id. at 58 (“Now, here it is alleged that these trade journals knew 
everything that has been alleged in that indictment, and then intentionally participated in it. Now, if 
knowing of that they had put their feet down and said, ‘No, we won’t cooperate,’ they could have 
prevented this particular scheme from working.”). 
 237 Id. at 105–06. 
 238 United States v. Socony-Vacuum (Socony-Vaccuum Oil, Co. II ), 105 F.2d 809, 814–15 (7th 
Cir. 1939). 
 239 Brief for the Respondents at 121, Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. I, 310 U.S. 150 (Nos. 346, 347) 
(noting that some fifty percent of contracts had hardwired industry benchmarks as payment term). 
 240 Transcript of Record, supra note 236, at 1184,1558–66, 3457–60, 3783, 3807–10, Socony-
Vacuum Oil Co. I, 310 U.S. 150 (Nos. 346, 347). 
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from their methodology.241 Sensing that they could not prevail on their bench-
mark manipulation argument, the government abandoned it. 242 
In fact, the oil companies’ two arguments contradicted one theory of 
benchmark manipulation but strongly supported a different theory of manipu-
lation. Oil companies’ purchases of gasoline were excluded from the bench-
mark companies’ datasets. But the absence of influence is a kind of influence. 
Every barrel of oil bought by the major oil companies was a barrel that could 
not be bought by one of the middlemen (“jobbers”) whose purchases were in-
cluded in the benchmark rate. By buying up any oil priced more cheaply than 
the current benchmark price, the oil companies could support the benchmark 
price against falling with the market. In this context, guilt is magnified rather 
than reduced by the fact that ninety-one percent of the oil purchased in this 
way was bought below the benchmark price.243 Had jobbers acquired it, the 
benchmark would have plummeted. By buying it themselves, the oil compa-
nies disqualified the oil from inclusion in the benchmark—all without lying, 
selectively disclosing data, or buying at artificial prices. 
b. Reliance 
As to reliance, common law fraud has long required a plaintiff to demon-
strate that she actually knew about the alleged misrepresentative actions and 
changed her conduct accordingly.244 For example, a seller’s representation of a 
car’s patent defects (“it looks old, but it is actually a new car”) may be action-
able, but only if the buyer hears the statement, reasonably believes it, and buys 
the car as a result. Our market abuse laws sometimes require this sort of “eye-
ball” reliance,245 and sometimes presume reliance.246 But, if the defendant can 
show an absence of reliance, then it is a bar to recovery.247 
Sometimes, benchmark manipulation may result in reliance. For example, 
a person may read the Kelley Blue Book value of a car and decide to buy a 
certain car on that basis. If the printed car value was intentionally inflated be-
                                                                                                                           
 241 Id. at 3783, 3807–10. 
 242 Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. II, 105 F.2d at 813 n.3 (dropping the indictment against price report-
ing agencies due to “legal insufficiency of the evidence to connect those defendants with the alleged 
conspiracy”). Indeed, this is part of why the case has come to stand for the doctrine of per se illegality 
under the Sherman Act; the holding need not have been so stark—that an agreement to fix prices and 
nothing more, suffices for liability—if the government had been able to demonstrate benchmark ma-
nipulation. 
 243 Brief for the Respondents, supra note 239, at 230. 
 244 See Acito v. IMCERA Grp., Inc., 47 F.3d 47, 52 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that reliance on de-
fendant’s false action is required for Rule 10b-5). 
 245 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 18(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (2012). 
 246 See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241–47 (1988). 
 247 See Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, 134 S.Ct. 2398, 2414–16 (2014). 
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cause of the data contributed by some dealership, it is conceivable that reliance 
can be demonstrated. 
Not all benchmark manipulation, however, works its injury through reli-
ance. In particular, when a benchmark term is hardwired into a price term, the 
payer is legally obliged to pay regardless of whether she believes that the price 
benchmark is currently accurate. One important effect of stipulating a formula 
that includes a benchmark is to avoid the day-to-day cost of convincing your 
counterparty to transact at a given price. The benchmark becomes dispositive 
at the time when it is adopted. While the parties continue to depend upon the 
benchmark and use the benchmark, dependence and use are not reliance.248 
Without misstatements and reliance, benchmark manipulation is a poor tar-
get for anti-fraud litigation. That is not to say that the law could not be made to 
cover these cases. “Fraudulent devices” is a term of art, and 10b-5 and her prog-
eny are meant to be catch-alls.249 Moreover, many defendants will find mere 
scrutiny by regulators sufficient to motivate settlement; in that sense, it matters 
less whether fraud is a good fit for benchmark manipulation than whether SEC 
or CFTC are motivated to scrutinize instance of benchmark manipulation. How-
ever, regulators’ bargaining power is shaped by courts’ possible behavior. If 
courts continue to be motivated by the doctrinal heritage of these rules, then anti-
fraud rules can only go so far stop these abusive practices. 
2. Better Enforcement by Protecting Price Reports 
Given the obstacles that our current regulatory regime faces in protecting 
against benchmark manipulation, a new approach is required. This new ap-
proach would reject the fallacy that if benchmarks are proxies for price then 
legal protections of benchmarks are proxies for protections of price. To the 
contrary, benchmarks are of independent significance, worthy of their own 
separate legal protection. It is worthwhile to attend momentarily to two reasons 
                                                                                                                           
 248 One or more party may have relied ex ante when deciding to incorporate the benchmark into 
the contract. But it would not have been reasonable reliance to believe that the benchmark was sure to 
be accurate. Most benchmarks’ documentation bear ample disclaimers as to accuracy. Nor would a 
reliance claim against the benchmark go to the manipulator. In the ordinary sense of reliance, the 
payer is unlikely to have relied upon the trader’s representations about truthfulness given that the 
payer has never communicated with the payer, the trader may not have even been in business at that 
time the benchmark was selected. 
 249 Enforcement with respect to LIBOR has utilized fraud claims in settling with major banks. See, 
e.g., Press Release, UBS Securities Japan Co. Ltd. to Plead Guilty to Felony Wire Fraud for Long-
running Manipulation of LIBOR Benchmark Interest Rates, Dep. of Justice (Dec. 19, 2012), 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/ubs-securities-japan-co-ltd-plead-guilty-felony-wire-fraud-long-running-
manipulation-libor, archived at https://perma.cc/EJV8-X6SV?type=source. But it remains to be seen 
whether fraud is sufficient for all of the LIBOR lawsuits, and for the manipulation of other benchmarks. 
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why the law might opt to provide fundamentally different and distinctive pro-
tections for benchmarks as opposed to prices generally. 
First, trustworthy benchmarks are essential infrastructure to common ven-
tures in a way that trustworthy prices themselves are not. Benchmarks serve as 
common referents in commerce, in much the way that weights and measures 
do.250 They do not tell us how much a farmer should be paid, any more than 
knowing what a “bushel” is tells us how much corn the farmer should deliver. 
But negotiations are likely to go far easier if both parties know how much 
money is often paid for a bushel of this sort of corn.251 Benchmarks provide 
the tools to discuss the matter and focal points from which to decide what is 
fair. Common understandings allow some negotiations, and even more litiga-
tion, to be avoided by including a mutually agreeable benchmark into a con-
tract. And those common understandings tend to iterate, promoting networks 
of common use and understanding.252 This is particularly true for benchmarks 
in financial derivatives, which are essential to markets.253 
The same network effects cannot be said for actual prices. Little is gained 
by pursuing widespread agreement as to an asset’s price itself. To the contrary, 
markets are predicated on widespread disagreement about the actual price of 
assets. Buyers buy, or sellers sell, in large part because they think that recent 
transactions depart from a better conception of market price. Such disagree-
ment is a precondition for liquid markets and markets are thought to be the 
best way for resolving such disagreement. The government need not resolve 
this disagreement, and so, market abuse law must cease its goal of price pro-
tection somewhere before exterminating ordinary market optimism (or pessi-
mism). On the contrary, there is good reason to encourage widespread adop-
tion of the same benchmarks. 
                                                                                                                           
 250 The importance of such standards awards them the distinct honor of being among the subject 
of Congress’s enumerated powers. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 5. 
 251 On weights and measures, see Joel T. Rosenthal, The Assizes of Weights and Measures in 
Medieval England, 17 WESTERN POL. Q. 409, 409 (1964). 
 252 Interestingly, the appropriate degree of protection does not appear to depend greatly on the 
fragility of the network. A fragile network deserves protection because it is a valuable thing that can 
be destroyed. A durable network is worthy of protection because of its tendency to rationally discour-
age self-help. For example, the widespread use of LIBOR provided an independent reason to use it. 
The expected cost from manipulation was dwarfed by the expected benefits of joining a network of 
users. Such LIBOR users are demonstrably better off than they would be by individually switching to 
a new benchmark, and that is precisely why law may be an appropriate tool to improve LIBOR. With-
out legal interventions, users may long accept a good-enough benchmark. 
 253 Widespread agreement to set contract prices to Platts’s Dated Brent allows a robust market to 
form. The same cannot be said of prices. Widespread agreement to set contract prices to “the current 
price of oil from the North Sea, commonly called ‘Brent’” provides no such benefit. Furthermore, the 
ability to make a bet on the movement of an asset relative to a widely known benchmark is a precon-
dition for sophisticated hedging and speculative strategies. 
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The fact that the law must limit itself in protecting prices, in a way that it 
need not for price benchmarks, serves as transition into the second reason that 
price benchmarks deserve distinctive legal protections: that they are especially 
protectable. 
It is conceptually easier to protect price reports than prices. “Price” is an 
ambiguous concept, and so proving artificial price is a conceptually difficult 
thing. What is the price of crude oil? Is it the most recent price paid for it? Or 
the most recent price paid for a certain large quantity? Or the price that some-
one is now offering to pay (perhaps, as reflected in bid/ask spreads)? Do taxes 
count? Counterparty? Although these definitional issues are commonly given 
inadequate attention, they must be addressed whenever price manipulation is 
alleged. Yet a defendant may have altered one but not another conception of 
price, leaving conceptually unclear how the law applies to the facts, and leav-
ing analytically open what facts must be demonstrated to prevail. The ambigui-
ty of “price” does not render it useless, but it renders price a poor damsel to be 
saved from distress. 
Price reports stand ready for defense though. While debates are possible, 
we mostly know what we mean when we say Platts Dated Brent. We know 
what it is, and we know what it means for it to be manipulated. It is manipulat-
ed when data is submitted in a way that Platts would consider to undermine the 
integrity of its methodology or otherwise disallow.254 Focusing on efforts to 
frustrate the benchmark will raise many of the same issues as a price manipula-
tion case—is there a benign explanation for this trader’s suspicious behav-
ior?—but some deep conceptual questions are avoided altogether. An ideal 
manipulation regime would recognize this philosophical difference and choose 
to draw its line at the more important and more defensible place in the sand: 
the proxy and not the price itself. 
If there is merit to banning benchmark manipulation, apart from manipu-
lation of the price itself, we will wish to ask how realistic is a benchmark-
centric approach to manipulation? Actually, no particular legislative action is 
required, at least in the commodities market.255 We already have statutory 
clauses perfectly suited to the purpose: the “Price Reports Clauses.” The 
Commodity Exchange Act prohibits “causing to be delivered . . . false or mis-
leading or inaccurate report concerning crop or market information or condi-
                                                                                                                           
 254 Two caveats are noteworthy. First, manipulation is clearly present when Platts itself seeks to 
facilitate manipulation, even if Platts’s rules are followed. Second, there may be some public use of a 
benchmark that is so widespread that the public has claim on the operation of the benchmark. The 
manipulation of LIBOR would not have been much better if there were a footnote on its provider’s 
web page authorizing fraudulent submissions. 
 255 For securities, Congressional action might be required to amend the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934, though there is little doubt that the SEC could shoehorn a Price Reports Rule into 10b-5. 
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tions that affect or tend to affect the price of any commodity in interstate 
commerce . . . .”256 These clauses prohibit misleading price reports, quite apart 
from whether anyone is misled. 
Numerous actions have been brought under these clauses, but they have 
focused on false submissions to price reporting agencies.257 For example, fol-
lowing the collapse of Enron, the CFTC brought numerous natural gas and 
electricity cases for telling benchmark providers about fictional transactions or 
those lacking in substance.258 In general, the CFTC has tended to treat the 
Price Reports Clause as a shortcut to prosecuting otherwise illegal acts.259 
Proving that a trader lied to a price-reporting agency, if sufficient, eliminates 
the need to prove that the lie caused an artificial price or that the trader intend-
ed to so cause. 
Perhaps because of the emphasis on fraud, courts have shown little inter-
est in applying Price Reports Clauses to benchmark abuse.260 Consider one 
striking example. Feeder cattle price futures contracts exhibit substantial 
hardwiring: the final value of CME cattle derivatives is deduced from the 
CME Feeder Cattle Index, which incorporates the U.S. Department of Agricul-
ture’s weekly public cattle report, which is derived from transactional data 
voluntarily submitted to the USDA by farmers and traders. In 2006, in the Ne-
braska District Court case Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Delay, 
the defendant and associates initiated five cattle purchases at prices rather 
higher than prevailing rates, thereby increasing the price of cattle futures they 
owned.261 Even though the court agreed that the transaction was “highly suspi-
cious,” it dismissed the CFTC’s action, holding “it is not a violation of the 
statute to report feeder cattle sales to the USDA with the intention of moving 
                                                                                                                           
 256 7 U.S.C. § 9(1)(A) (2012) (added in the Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1750 
(codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. and 15 U.S.C. (2012))); accord 7 U.S.C. § 13(a)(2) (2012) 
(stating criminal penalty for the same violation). 
 257 See, e.g., U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Atha, 420 F. Supp. 2d 1373, 1376–78 
(N.D. Ga. 2006) (alleging false reporting). Interestingly, LIBOR settlements have also drawn on the 
price reports clauses. See Order Instituting Proceedings Pursuant to Sections 6(C) and 6(D) of the 
Commodity Exchange Act, as Amended, Making Findings and Imposing Remedial Sanctions at 34, 
Barclays PLC, CFTC No. 12-25 (June, 26, 2012), available at http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/
public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/legalpleading/enfbarclaysorder062712.pdf, archived at 
https://perma.cc/S9TS-U4UU. 
 258 United States v. Reliant Energy Servs., Inc., 420 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1045–47 (N.D. Cal. 2006); 
In re Dynegy Mktg. & Trade, Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 29,262, 2–5 (CFTC 2002). 
 259 JERRY MARKHAM, COMMODITIES REGULATION: FRAUD, MANIPULATION & OTHER CLAIMS 
§ 16:10.50 (2012) (describing CFTC’s post-Enron uses of the Price Report Clause as another attempt 
by the CFTC to avoid proving substantive manipulation). 
 260 There may also be a cloud over the Clauses because of suspicions that Enron inspired actions 
may have been targeting legitimate market behaviors that simply sought to maximize profits in light 
of defective pricing laws. See id. 
 261 No. 7:05CV5026, 2006 WL 3359076, at *1 (D. Neb. 2006). 
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the CME index up or down—rather, to be unlawful, the reported sales must be 
sham or nonexistent transactions, or the reports must be knowingly false or 
misleading.”262 Delay has come to stand for the infamous proposition that in-
tentional benchmark manipulation, absent fraud or fraudulent transactions, is 
not unlawful.263 
Because abuse of price reports is a distinctive harm, apart from manipula-
tion of prices themselves, it makes sense to reinvigorate the two statutory 
clauses assigned to remedying it. Our peers in Europe acted quickly, in the 
wake of massive interest rate benchmark scandals, to adopt a regulation recog-
nizing benchmark manipulation as a distinctive illegal act.264 They did so out 
of concern that their general market abuse regulations did not sufficiently iden-
tify benchmarks as worthy of protection, apart from any underlying prices.265 
Europeans believed that they were following America in creating these rules. 
Irony is no bar to us following their lead in the same spirit.  
It is not possible or desirable here to outline an entire jurisprudence of 
price reports, but some important features can be noted.266 Courts must provide 
clarity on unanswered questions arising out of the “open market” manipulation 
cases. Courts seem to agree that a party cannot be a manipulator if she makes 
only real trades with sufficient genuine economic purposes. That is, an actual 
purchase of securities, motivated by a desire to own the securities, cannot be 
manipulation, even if you also wished to influence the price. Yet this construc-
tion takes the trade to be a monolithic thing, which either was or was not—as a 
whole—motivated by economic purposes. And yet, trades can be disaggregat-
ed into smaller elements, each element of which can be properly or improperly 
                                                                                                                           
 262 Id. at *3. 
 263 In re Amaranth Natural Gas Commodities Litig., 587 F. Supp. 2d 513, 533–34 n.133 
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (citing Delay, 2006 WL 3359076); JERRY MARKHAM, LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE 
HISTORY OF FINANCIAL MARKET MANIPULATION 385 (2014). But see In re McMahan, Comm. Fut. 
L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 31,662, 2010 WL 4491884, at *5–8 (CFTC Nov. 5, 2010) (facing similar fact pattern 
but convicting for false reporting).  
 264 Directive 2014/57 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 Apr. 2014 on Criminal 
Sanctions for Market Abuse, 2014 O.J. (L 173) 29–30, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.2014.173.01.0179.01.ENG, archived at http://perma.cc/MDW4-
YJGC (defining manipulation to include “transmitting false or misleading information or providing 
false or misleading inputs or any other behaviour which manipulates the calculation of a benchmark”).  
 265 Amended Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Insider 
Dealing and Market Manipulation, at 2–3, COM (2012) 0421 final (July 25, 2012), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/docs/abuse/COM_2012_421_en.pdf, archived at http://
perma.cc/7VC6-HMQF. 
 266 The difficulty of spelling out the contours of any manipulation regime, or even an adequate 
definition of “manipulation” may be part of why the CFTC and SEC have cleaved to fraud based 
accounts of manipulation. Nor is a perfect doctrine sufficient for optimal enforcement. Such causes of 
action increase the importance of sophisticated detection and proof techniques. For a description of 
empirical screens and their application, see generally Abrantes-Metz et al., supra note 219. 
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motivated. For example, a trader may buy an asset out of genuine investment 
interest, but her choice of where, when, from whom or how to buy it may have 
non-investment motivations. Benchmark manipulation often works in precisely 
this way. Having committed to buying an asset for genuine economic reasons, 
a trader has the option to trade either (A) in a manner that the benchmark will 
either incorporate the trade; or (B) such that the benchmark will not incorpo-
rate the trade. When the price is identical across venues, the current doctrine 
would give the trader a free pass to strategically affect the benchmark. And 
when prices are nearly identical, there will be great practical difficulties with 
showing that an inferior price was elected for manipulative purposes.267 
It is clear that manipulative intent should be prohibited not just in respect 
to whether to transact, but in respect to how to transact. The same must be true 
of data submission. A trader who releases only the most strategically chosen 
subset of her trade data may offend the Price Reports Clauses. 
Still, caution here is appropriate.268 Not only are misunderstandings pos-
sible in hindsight, but the institutional context of data submission is vital, too. 
After all, there is never an investment reason to voluntarily submit data to a 
benchmark provider; the investment has been made, regardless of whether one 
decides to announce it. Whether the motives be manipulative, civic (to pre-
serve the valued social institution of the benchmark), or some other reason, 
firms will have some agenda when they submit data. Is all such data submis-
sion to be suspect? Punishing such mixed-motives cases too aggressively is 
guaranteed to silence voluntary data contributors. Unless widespread participa-
tion is compelled,269 the fear of liability will discourage data submission. And 
even then, the fear of liability would discourage some legitimate trading, 
which stands to harm price discovery and liquidity. Genuinely manipulative 
motives must be distinguished from the simple absence of investment motives, 
which remains difficult task. The law must balance chilling effect of unjusti-
fied prosecution must be weighted against the ill of market manipulation. 
                                                                                                                           
 267 These difficulties are only greater when the trader is an intermediary handling trades for a 
client. Such a trader has many opportunities to select the venue of her choice at no or little cost to her 
client. Indeed, as a practical matter, client-facing business provides apparent justification for nearly 
any transaction. A trader who sells at rock bottom prices or buys too dearly may have been hedging 
past or future customer orders. The presence of an offsetting customer order is helpful circumstantial 
evidence for the manipulator. Indeed, it is telling that regulators will be drawn down the rabbit hole of 
showing a lack of offsetting customer orders; historically, the CFTC has spent its time trying to show 
the presence of offsetting orders. The Commodity Exchange Act specifically prohibits wash trades, or 
transactions designed to offset one another and thereby eliminate any economic substance. Complex 
institutions with responsibilities for other people’s money gain a smokescreen against regulatory scru-
tiny as they pursue non-fraudulent manipulations. 
 268 It is appropriate, therefore, that the CFTC has adopted a “good faith mistake” provision in its 
rule, tracking the statute. 17 C.F.R. § 180.1(a)(4) (2012). 
 269 See infra notes 282–292 and accompanying text. 
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B. Benchmark Regulation: The “European” Approach 
Can governments make forward-looking rules that reduce the prevalence 
of manipulation before it ever occurs? This Section examines efforts to regu-
late production and use of benchmarks before they are manipulated. It takes 
the European Commission’s Proposed Regulation of Benchmarks as its prima-
ry foil. The Proposed Regulation is the most ambitious and among the most 
viable proposals for reshaping the benchmark space. The Proposed Regulation 
would ban the use of some particularly vulnerable or unsuitable benchmarks 
and institute new governance and transparency requirements for the rest. 
Although these proposals are not outrageous, they do not reflect adequate 
understanding of the role and operation of benchmarks. The proposed regula-
tion is badly under-inclusive, making arbitrary distinctions between the 
benchmarks that are subject to regulation and those that are not.270 It is unlike-
ly that ESMA (the European SEC) will be better at detecting flawed rates than 
would be market participants, nor more courageous in outlawing a benchmark 
that the market still finds attractive. What little indication we have suggests 
that European regulators will target benchmarks that are politically salient ra-
                                                                                                                           
 270 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on Indices Used as 
Benchmarks in Financial Instruments and Financial Contracts, at 7, COM (2013) 641 final (Sept. 18, 
2013) [hereinafter Proposed Regulation], available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUri
Serv.do?uri=COM:2013:0641:FIN:EN:PDF, archived at https://perma.cc/U83H-NYLA?type=pdf. 
The EC regulation applies only to financial derivatives, investment funds, and consumer financial con-
tracts such as mortgages. However, benchmarks are hardwired into far more contracts than just those. 
Employment contracts, supply contracts, and many spot contracts all use benchmarks. Moreover, courts 
will frequently use benchmarks in assessing damages, implicitly integrating the benchmark into any 
breached contract. See, e.g., Banque Paribas v. Landsea Mktg, Inc. (In re Landsea Mktg.), 53 B.R. 
436, 437 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1985) (deciding whether to use LIBOR or Prime as the rate for lost dam-
ages). The EC regulation excludes these other types of benchmark uses, even though the EC’s own 
impact assessment identifies several of these uses. Commission Staff Working Document Impact As-
sessment, at 5, 78–80, COM (2013) 641 final (Sept. 18, 2013) [hereinafter Impact Assessment], avail-
able at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:52013SC0336, archived at 
http://perma.cc/XN4R-5VHZ (citing supply contracts as a specific concern and discussing the impact 
on spot contracts). Likewise, the regulation specifically excludes single-asset benchmarks, such as 
closing prices of securities, Proposed Regulation, supra, at 14, even though the regulation’s definition 
of a benchmark or index clearly contemplates such narrow-focused proxies. Id. at 21 (defining “in-
dex” as calculated “on the basis of the value of one or more underlying assets, or prices, including 
estimated prices, or other values.”) (emphasis added). The Commission reasons that single-item 
benchmarks are to be excluded because “there is no calculation, input data or discretion.” Id. at 14. 
The Commission is simply wrong on this point for the reasons discussed in Part III.C. See supra notes 
176–202 and accompanying text. Narrow-based benchmarks are among the most important bench-
marks we observe, and there are few securities manipulations that do not make such benchmarks their 
situs. Without further explanation by the Commission, it is more natural to assume that the contours of 
the Proposed Regulation really just reflect fixation with scandals that directly animated it. Because 
spot oil contracts and equity closing prices had little to do with LIBOR, the Proposed Regulation does 
not prioritize any sort of a principled approach to them. Whatever the appropriate treatment of bench-
marks, it is unlikely that the right line is drawn so jaggedly. 
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ther than genuinely worrisome.271 For the benchmarks that are regulated but 
not banned, it is very difficult for governments to craft rational and helpful 
rules governing benchmarks. There are deep problems in the Commission’s 
proposed requirements, as described infra. 
Notwithstanding all of these difficulties, governments cannot avoid regu-
lating in this space, if only because they are major consumers of bench-
marks.272 A government’s choice to use a benchmark carries an endorsement 
of the benchmark’s suitability for use. Numerous commentators have pointed 
out the fact that the United States Treasury used LIBOR to make TARP loans 
during the financial crisis, despite being on notice that LIBOR was a manipu-
lated benchmark.273 Treasury therefore passed up an opportunity to protect 
itself and warn others about emerging problems with the benchmark. 
Government use (or non-use) also anchors a large network of users. 
Benchmarks are most useful when they are used widely.274 The fact that many 
others are using a particular benchmark is a reason to use it as well. As large 
users of benchmarks, responsive governments could be demanding customers, 
using their role as customer to improve the benchmark market without new 
legal strictures. Historically, governments have been rather unresponsive, ossi-
fying the market in favor of incumbent benchmarks. Governments can and 
should evaluate benchmarks for their suitability of use, knowing that govern-
ment adoption will have spillover effect of helping markets to coalesce around 
their preferred benchmark. 
So how should governments influence benchmarks, whether as regulators 
mandating the features (and banning non-compliant benchmarks) or as users 
                                                                                                                           
 271 One distinctive component of the Proposed Regulation is its introduction of a “suitability” 
standard for the hardwiring of benchmarks, that imposes on banks a duty to select benchmarks that are 
suitable for their counterparties. Proposed Regulation, supra note 270, at 31. The Commission is clear 
that it is concerned that many mortgages in Spain and Italy had hardwired LIBOR as the payment rate. 
Impact Assessment, supra note 270, at 13. Yet there is no suggestion that inappropriately chosen 
benchmarks have harmed any identifiable constituency in any recent benchmark scandal. If LIBOR 
manipulation had a net effect on borrowers, it is likely to have helped them by lowering their interest 
rate obligations. Second, it is not obvious that LIBOR was an inappropriate benchmark even in the 
cases the Commission cites. LIBOR largely represents banks’ cost of funds. If a different rate were 
imposed on mortgages, such as some sort of cost-of-living adjustment like CPI, then the variable 
mortgage rate would move apart from bank cost of funds. When the mortgage rate exceeded the 
bank’s cost of funds, it would be rational for borrowers to refinance their mortgages with a fixed rate 
reflecting bank’s current cost of funds. Non-bank-based rates would be quickly driven from the mar-
ket. It may be that variable rate mortgages are all unsuitable for borrowers, but bank-based ones seem 
uniquely suitable given the that belief. Although there were clearly many problems with LIBOR, the 
lesson from the suitability rule is that European regulators may not be entirely technocratic in deter-
mining whether a benchmark is acceptable. 
 272 Rauterberg & Verstein, supra note 56, at 148–50.  
 273 TARP Urged to Drop Use of Libor, WASH. POST, Oct. 25, 2012, at A18. 
 274 See supra note 252 and accompanying text. 
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picking terms to hardwire? The remainder of this Section is spent criticizing 
intuitive proposals, and contrasting them to a related and better approaches. 
1. Against Objectivity 
The EC Proposed Regulation calls for increased objectivity in benchmark 
design and operation.275 This approach channels fears that LIBOR, the global 
interest rate benchmark, was susceptible to manipulation because it was based 
on hypothetical transactions. A rate built out of only real transactions would 
have been robust to that sort of corruption. This approach has other propo-
nents, such as former CFTC Chairman Gary Gensler, “To be reliable, indices 
have to be transaction-based and transparent.”276 
Yet, the foreign exchange market benchmarks are almost entirely objec-
tive and transaction-based,277 and that market has been the locus of abuse. In 
the words of Gensler’s UK counterpart, Martin Wheatley manipulation in FX 
has been, “every bit as bad as [LIBOR].”278 Objectivity does not seem to have 
brought robustness. 
Objective methodologies are blueprints to manipulators,279 helping them 
to ply their trade, and a transaction-data-only rule gives the large trader power 
to set the price.280 The use of non-transactional data (such as market partici-
pants’ perceptions of where the price is) by a benchmark provides a larger data 
pool, decreasing domain concentration, and it gives the index provider greater 
discretion to adjust for suspected manipulation. Therefore, any solution to ma-
                                                                                                                           
 275 Proposed Regulation, supra note 270, at 25–26 (“The input data shall be transaction data.”); 
see Daniel L. Doctoroff, Op-Ed., A Market Alternative to Libor, WALL ST. J., Aug. 3, 2012, at A11 
(Bloomberg CEO writes: “Benchmarks such as Libor that rely on subjective assessments . . . simply 
cannot accurately reflect market realities.”); Hannah Kuchler, BoE Governor Urges Reform of Libor, 
FIN. TIMES, June 29, 2012, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/7a76a74a-c1d2-11e1-b76a-00144feabdc0.html, 
archived at https://perma.cc/X85R-E2V9?type=pdf (reporting that Bank of England governor believes 
that LIBOR should be based on actual transactions rather than estimate). 
 276 Peter Eavis & Nathaniel Popper, Libor Scandal Shows Many Flaws in Rate-Setting, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 19, 2012, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/07/19/libor-scandal- shows-many-flaws-in-
rate-setting, archived at http://perma.cc/MM5V-NQ5D. 
 277 See supra notes 97–143 and accompanying text. 
 278 Foreign Exchange Allegations ‘as Bad as Libor’, Says Regulator, BBC NEWS (Feb 4, 2014), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/business-26041039, archived at http://perma.cc/E4XJ-Q6R7. 
 279 Clear rules for acquiring and using data in any domain invites gamesmanship. OSHA inspec-
tions of workplace safety tend not to detect problems if the employer is told precisely when the in-
spection will occur and how it will be scored. Compare Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc. 436 U.S. 307, 325 
(requiring warrant and notice for inspection), with id. at 329–30 (Stevens, J. dissenting) (arguing that 
notice and delay will harm inspections). 
 280 Rosa Abrantes-Metz & David S. Evans, Enhancing Financial Benchmarks: Comments on the 
OICU-IOSCO Consultation Report on Financial Benchmarks 8 (Working Paper, 2013), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2216209, archived at http://perma.cc/B9P4-LZ7W. 
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nipulation must avoid ossifying benchmark governance within a comforting 
but creaking objectivity.281 
Far from mandating objectivity or transaction-primacy, governments 
should recognize a safe harbor for good faith mistakes by benchmark providers 
made in the course of trying to improve the robustness of the rate.282 As it 
stands benchmark provider may fear regulatory reprisal if they should exclude 
certain suspicious data and later be found to have caused an erroneous output. 
They may prefer to err on the side of objectivity so that they can later avoid 
any culpability for the exploitation of their systems. It would be far better for 
benchmark providers to be granted sufficient protection to take the steps they 
think necessary to keep the system working best. 
2. Against Transparency 
The European Commission’s Proposed Regulation contemplates two 
types of disclosure. First, it requires the benchmark provider to publish input 
data “immediately after publication of the benchmark except where publication 
would have serious adverse consequences . . . .”283 Benchmark providers have 
resisted calls for transparency.284 They fear that disclosing the data they use to 
                                                                                                                           
 281 See Rauterberg & Verstein, supra note 56, at 123–24. Indeed, even currency benchmark pro-
viders reserve for themselves the same option to ex post modify the output as needed to preserve cred-
ibility and accuracy. WM/Reuters allows for a myriad of supplemental data, including unexecuted 
bids and offers, and transactions in other currencies. See Spot & Forward Rates Guide, supra note 
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00144feabdc0.html?siteedition=intl#axzz2jbjC9AZk, archived at https://perma.cc/649C-VQX4
?type=pdf. Even the EC acknowledge this at times. Impact Assessment, supra note 270, at 5–6. 
 282 Similar concerns influence the willingness of market participants to supply data. Stewart, 
supra note 170, at 6 (“Companies faced with severe penalties for misreporting deals, and with no 
penalties for non-reporting of deals, have taken the easy course. The number of deals reported outside 
the assessment windows has declined.”). 
 283 Proposed Regulations, supra note 270, at 30–31. 
 284 They have gone so far as to invoke journalistic privilege under the First Amendment. See, e.g., 
U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. McGraw-Hill Cos., 507 F. Supp. 2d 45, 48–49, 54–55 
(D.D.C. 2007) (holding that reporter’s qualified privilege protected his publishing price index of natu-
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manipulations); In re Natural Gas Commodities Litig., 235 F.R.D. 241, 242–43 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) 
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compute their benchmarks will discourage market participants from sharing 
data with them.285 Hence the second kind of disclosure: At least for the most 
critical benchmarks, traders may be forced to disclose their trades to the 
benchmark provider.286 
Voluntariness is a key element of benchmark manipulation, so if traders 
had to submit all their trading data to benchmark providers, or if they were 
only permitted to trade on exchanges that committed to compile all their trad-
ing data, the problem of strategic disclosure would be reduced.287 Then only 
outright fraud or genuinely uneconomic trades, which have always been ille-
gal, could impact the benchmark price. And benchmark-level transparency 
would help detect such schemes. So is mandatory data submission and wide-
spread disclosure a panacea? Unfortunately, numerous obstacles make this 
path a challenging one. 
First, the benefit of submitting and aggregating data is often too low to be 
worthwhile. For example, it would not be cost-effective to conduct all airport 
kiosk currency trades through a centralized currency exchange or report them 
to a central data repository. 
Second, many transactions are of a kind that many consider to be legiti-
mately private. While we may be comfortable forcing professional traders to 
share their data, we may think that a farmer’s crop prices are her business, or 
the price at which Apple exchanges currency is reasonably the concern only of 
Apple. The sphere of legitimate privacy may be couched in terms of incen-
tives. Greater transparency allows freeriding by third parties, decreasing the 
value to the trader of having researched or—in the case of a business strategy 
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 285 Argus Sour Crude Index: Methodology and Specification Guide, ARGUS MEDIA 5 (Aug. 
2014), https://media.argusmedia.com/~/media/Files/PDFs/Meth/ASCI.pdf, archived at https://perma.
cc/BA5H-CCPC. 
 286 Proposed Regulations, supra note 270, at 29–30 (permitting mandatory contribution of data 
when twenty percent of critical benchmark contributors cease to contribute). 
 287 Some steps in this direction have been taken. The Dodd-Frank Act requires many swap trans-
actions to be executed on regulated exchanges, where their data may presumably be aggregated with 
greater ease. Data from swaps executed off-exchange will likewise be gathered. See Regulation of 
Off-Exchange Retail Foreign Exchange Transactions and Intermediaries, 75 Fed. Reg. 55,410, 55,410 
(Sept 10, 2010) (codified at 7 C.F.R. pts. 1, 3, 4, 5, 10,140,145, 147,160, & 166). Equity trades con-
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70 Fed. Reg. 37,496, 37,396 (June 29, 2005) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200–01, 230, 240, 242, 249, 
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it exercised. Determination of Foreign Exchange Swaps and Foreign Exchange Forwards Under the 
Commodity Exchange Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 69,694, 69,694 (Nov. 20, 2012). 
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linked to trades—generated the information.288 Transparency can improve 
markets, but it comes at a cost if it discourages productive activities or some 
trading activities.289 
A final consideration is that public policy is not always in favor of publi-
cizing prices. Such prices make it easier for cartels to form.290 “The key chal-
lenge for a cartel is to avert secret deviations.”291 That is, cartels must prevent 
their members from secretly selling at lower than the cartelized price. Manda-
tory and transparent benchmark participation could make it easier to detect and 
punish defectors, and therefore make it easier for conspirators to fix price.292 
Greater disclosure of transactions is likely a public good worth develop-
ing, but it is not a costless one. A cautious and context specific approach is 
likely appropriate. More moderate suggestions, such as mandatory record 
keeping, seem like intermediate solutions that engender widespread support.293 
3. Against Governance 
Many benchmarks are made by entities that also use the benchmark. For 
example, the banks that helped create LIBOR were also the ones most likely to 
use it in their financial derivative contracts.294 The EC Proposed Regulation is 
suitably concerned that wearing two hats may tempt benchmark providers to 
                                                                                                                           
 288 A debate therefore rages about the proper status of “dark pools”—private exchanges run by 
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 289 See Paul Asquith et al., The Effects of Mandatory Transparency in Financial Market Design: 
Evidence from the Corporate Bond Market, 3–6 (NBER Working Paper No. 19417, 2013), http://
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 292 See generally Ian Ayres, How Cartels Punish: A Structural Theory of Self-Enforcing Collu-
sion, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 295 (1987) (examining the ability of collusive market participants to punish 
each other for breaching cartel agreements). 
 293 BD. OF THE INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, supra note 68, at 14; Proposed Regulation, supra 
note 270, at 49. Of course, it remains to ask “what is record keeping?” It is one thing to ban the de-
struction of transactional data that might indicate strategic behavior, it is quite another to, say, affix a 
narrative explanation justifying each trade or data submission a firm makes. 
 294 If anything, the benchmark market has become more conflicted despite widespread awareness of 
LIBOR problems. See, e.g., Chris Flood, LSE Deal Heralds Indexing Overhaul, FIN. TIMES, June 29, 
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stock exchange represents greater conglomeration, of the sort described in Rauterberg & Verstein, supra 
note 56). 
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favor themselves at the margins.295 The EC program involves limiting conflicts 
and requiring certain governance systems for the conflicts that remain. 
This is an invasive and costly approach. It is strange that the European 
Commission did not ask why benchmark providers would not themselves 
choose to use the best governance techniques. Surely if they wished to control 
conflicts, perhaps at the behest of their customers, they could do a better job 
than any administratively prescribed compliance program. Where benchmark 
providers’ incentives have been aligned with their users, good practices have 
generally resulted.296 
Other scholarly work has extensively charted the market forces that en-
courage better benchmark governance, so it will be appropriate to only revisit 
those findings.297 At present, many benchmarks are produced as a byproduct, 
or in service, of some other primary business activity. This structure tends to 
discourage competition and investments in quality. By contrast, if benchmark 
providers understand that they are compensated for providing excellent 
benchmarks, they will have a better incentive to secure representative data, and 
to seek out more customers by competing with inadequate benchmarks. Find-
ing profitable inducements for benchmarks, rather than solely new burdens, 
might help stop the apparent flight from benchmark production that we now 
observe.298 
CONCLUSION 
This Article began by noting a seeming dissonance between the scholarly 
view of manipulation and the empirical reality. This dissonance reflected the 
fact that most scholarly engagement is an accurate discussion of price manipu-
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lation, although the world is rife with price benchmark manipulation. Price 
benchmark manipulation is rife because of our rational and widespread de-
pendence upon benchmarks that are inherently susceptible to influence. This 
dependence and susceptibility was explored in the case foreign currency, crude 
oil, and equity securities. In light of their utility, it makes sense to save our 
benchmarks through appropriate legal interventions. This means reversing an 
erroneous obsession with fraud in our market abuse doctrine, and striking out a 
new path into a jurisprudence of price reports; it also means avoiding stifling 
and ill-conceived regulation of the benchmark sector. 
Having explored many of the major features and challenges of benchmark 
manipulation, numerous puzzles nevertheless remain for future research. De-
fining “manipulation” has proven a perennial difficulty among scholars of ma-
nipulation, and this difficult expresses itself in the context of benchmark ma-
nipulation as well. It is appropriate to prohibit manipulatively selective trading 
data to benchmarks, but we are reluctant to force all trading into the sunlight. 
In the absence of requirements of universal transparency, we depend on volun-
tary disclosures and should be unsurprised if such disclosures are less common 
where they would injure the trader than when they help. Is there a principle by 
which good submission practices can be easily distinguished from bad? Or is 
there a structural solution, some redesign of market structure, that would ren-
der manipulation less harmful? These remain questions for further inquiry.  
After calling currency benchmark manipulation the “biggest series of 
quantifiable wrongdoing in the history of our financial services industry,”299 
Martin Wheatley, head of Britain’s chief market regulator noted that the ma-
nipulation was a “surprise for all of us.”300 With the insight of this article, ma-
nipulation need not come as much of a surprise. At present it is no surprise 
because our market relies on vulnerable structures and our law does little to 
support them. Yet it is conceivable that benchmark manipulation could become 
rare and unmemorable again. It would be a relief to return to an era of plain old 
fraud. 
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